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Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control:
The Paradox of Punishment in Minority
Communitiest
Jeffrey Fagan* and Tracey L. Meares"
Since the early 1970s, the number of individuals in jails and state
andfederal prisons has grown exponentially. Today, nearly two million
people are currently incarceratedin state and federalprisons and local
jails. The growth of imprisonment has been borne disproportionatelyby.
African-American and Hispanic men from poor communities in urban
areas. Rising.incarcerationshould have greatly reduced the crime rate.
After all, incapacitatedoffenders were no longer free to rob, assault,
steal, or commit other crimes. However, no large-scale reduction in
crime was detected until the mid-1990s. The failure of crime rates to
decline commensurately with increases in the rate and severity of
punishment reveals a paradox of punishment: recent experiments have
shown that among persons of color, especially those who are poor or
reside in poor neighborhoods, harsher punishment has produced
iatrogenicor counterdeterrenteffects.
We identify two processes that produce punishment paradoxes or
defiance of legal sanctions. First, the long-term and spatially
concentratedshift of social and economic resourcesfrom informal social
controls to formal legal controls, particularly incarceration, weakens
localized informal social controls and creates recurring cycles of
discontrol. Neighborhoodand work contexts offer socialstatus and mete
out shame and social opprobriafor wrongdoing. However, stable rates
of inequality and deprivation in minority communities compromise three
dimensions of social control: social capital or regulation, "stakes in
conformity" through marriage and work, and participationin political
institutions. Second, high rates ofpunishmentproduce "stigma erosion"
where punishment loses its contingent value that lends credibility to its
claims of fairness and proportionality. As the social and cultural
t Thanks to Dan Kahan, Owen Fiss, Tom Tyler, and workshop participants at the University
of Chicago School of Law, Columbia Law School, and the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation
Punishment Working Group, for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Excellent research assistance
was provided by Mukul Bakshi and Rubina Madni.
* Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University; Director, Center on Crime,
Community and Law, Columbia Law School.
** Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Senior Research Fellow,
Berkeley Center for Criminal Justice.
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distance between the punishers and the punished widens, respectfor the
legitimacy of punishment suffers. Dissatisfaction with both procedural
and distributivejustice can motivate legal cynicism and noncompliance,
and these processes are intensified in contexts of weak social control and
high legal control.
As legal control replaces informal social control, the state's role in
socialization and the fostering of moral communities diminishes. The
devolving of the public sector involvement in socializationfurther moots
the reintegrative functions of punishment. This restructuring and
devaluation of government, accompanied by the restructuring and
fragmentation of economic activity in poor communities, complicates the
achievement of a social consensus on the rationale of punishment in a
broader context of social control, and limits the efficacy of informal
processes ofsocial regulation.
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PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing today, the number of persons
incarcerated in the U.S. increased massively, incapacitating many criminals and
increasing the risk of punishment for those still active.1 Between 1975 and 1989,
the total annual prison population of the United States nearly tripled, growing from
240,593 to 683,367 inmates in custody, an increase of 184%.2 The trend continued
uninterrupted, albeit at a slower pace, through 2006, when the prison population
rose to 1,492,973. 3 Put another way, the incarceration rate rose from about 145 per
100,000 population in 1980 to 499 per 100,000 in 2006. 4 Both the likelihood of
being committed to prison, and the average sentence length of those committed,
increased dramatically over that time. 5 These factors should have greatly reduced
the crime rate.
Punishment on a scale of this sort had never before been attempted or
achieved in the United States, and its proponents anticipated large reductions in
crime rates. After all, the large number of active offenders incapacitated were no
longer free to rob, assault, steal, or commit other crimes-at least against those
outside of penitentiary walls. Also, a downward demographic bulge in the 1980s
shrunk the population group whose crime rates traditionally have been highest,
reducing the pool of potential replacements for incarcerated offenders. Deterrence
theory suggested that would-be offenders were likely to rate the likely punishment
costs of crime as significantly higher, reducing their incentives to risk
imprisonment for highly variable gains from crime. And, there was also reason to
think that at least some would-be offenders were getting the message as the
rhetoric of punishment escalated during this time. Well-publicized legal reforms
and popular culture communicated new messages of intolerance for crime and
threats of new draconian forms of punishment.
1 See Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in US. Prisons, 1980-1996, in
PRISONS 17 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999); Jacqueline Cohen & Jose A. CanelaCacho, Incarceration and Violent Crime: 1965-1988, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
VIOLENCE 296 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994); Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of
Prison PopulationSize on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison OvercrowdingLitigation, 111 Q. J.
ECON. 319 (1996).
2 See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1996 (1999).
3 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL SURVEYS (2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjslglanceltables/corr2tab.htm. See also Blumstein & Beck, supra note 1,
at 22 (citing data from the BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., supra note 2, and the Bureau of the Census
(various years)).
4 Blumstein & Beck, supra note 1, at 18. This includes both state and federal prisoners but
excludes persons in county jails. I took the 1,492,973 prison population information data and divided
it by the population of 298,754,819, as estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau for July 2006, available
at http:llwww.census.gov/popest/stateslNST-ann-est.html.
5 See generally MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006).

(1999);

BRUCE WESTERN,
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Despite the many reasons to expect significant crime reduction from the
expansion in punishment, no large-scale reduction in crime was detected. Through
the early 1990s, both officially recorded crime and self-reports of victimization
failed to decline even as the incarceration rate increased.6 Homicides rose steadily
in U.S. cities beginning in 1985, with record rates measured nationally as well as
in fourteen large cities in 1991. 7 Other crimes remained stable, while the
victimization rate declined only slightly.8 Although crime rates have declined in
recent years from their peak in the early 1990s, they remain at high levels in the
face of increasing costs of crime, especially considering the unprecedented
increases in incarceration rates in recent decades.
The failure of crime rates to decline commensurately with increases in the rate
and severity of punishment reveals a paradox of punishment: higher incarceration
rates resulted in stable if not higher levels of crime.
Several explanations could be fashioned.
First, despite the stochastic
selectivity of incarceration policies (that is, the highest rate offenders were likely
to be over-represented among prison populations), only modest incapacitation
effects, estimated at less than ten percent of potential violent crimes, were
achieved. 9 This means that in order to achieve measurable decreases in crime
through incapacitation, we would have10to further commit to an unrealistically
expensive increase in incarceration rates.
Second, it is possible that punishment backfired. That is, there is growing
evidence from several small-scale studies that incarceration may have iatrogenic
effects with respect to offending rates."
6

See MAUER, supra note 5; MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND

PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995); FRANKLIN E. ZMRiNG & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACrrATION:
PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRimE (1995); Richard B. Freeman, Why Do So Many
Young American Men Commit Crimes and What Might We Do About It?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25

(1996).
7 See FRANKLIN E. ZmtING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1997); Phillip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in
Youth Violence, in YOUTH VIOLENCE 27 (Michael Tonry & Mark H. Moore eds., 1998).
8
9

See ZIvRING & HAWKINS, supra note 6; Cohen & Canela-Cacho, supra note 1.
See Cohen & Canela-Cacho, supra note 1, at 371 n.56. Even as crime rates have declined

from their peaks in the early 1990s, incarceration played a minor role in that reduction. The "66-

percent increase in the state prison population, from 725,000 to more than 1.2 million prisoners
reduced the rate of serious crime by 2 to 5 percent-one-tenth of the fall in crime between 1993 and
2001. Fully 90 percent would have happened without the 480,000 new inmates in the system."
WESTERN, supra note 5, at 186-87.
10 See Cohen & Canela-Cacho, supra note 1. They claim that the prison population would
have to nearly triple before crime declines would increase to 20 percent.
11 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan, Do Criminal Sanctions Deter Drug Crimes?, in DRUGS AND
CRIME 188 (Doris Layton MacKenzie & Craig D. Uchida eds., 1994); Jeffrey Fagan, The
Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism among
Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77 (1996); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance,
Deterrence and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445
(1993).
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Third, motivations and incentives among would-be offenders for crime
commission may have increased over this period, or the general and specific
deterrent effects of incarceration may have been weak or ineffective.' 2 Under this
scenario, less active offenders replaced incarcerated ones at the higher offending
rates; those released from prison quickly returned to crime at rates equal to or
13
higher than before; and, quite possibly, new people joined the ranks of offenders.
Whatever the effects, the lack of further crime reductions over a period of
was ineffective, irrelevant, or
expanding incarceration suggest that punishment
14
even provocative with respect to crime.
The story we tell in this essay is not confined to an explanation of this
punishment paradox, however. Rather, we emphasize the special impact that the
dramatic increase in punishment has had on African Americans. While the
increase in American punishment is impressive as a general matter, the
involvement of African Americans is staggering. 15 The growth in incarceration, by
population especially but also by rates, has been far greater for African Americans
than for any other ethnic or racial group. 16 A few statistics illustrate: While the
number of African Americans incarcerated in state correctional facilities has long
been disproportionate to the percentage of African Americans in the population,
African Americans comprised 45% of state prison populations. 17 From 1980 to
12 See Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First
Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1998) (discussing the loss of contingent threat of criminal punishment

under conditions of mass incarceration).
13 See Freeman, supra note 6.
14 But see Levitt, supra note 1 (showing deterrent effects of incarceration based on natural
experiments of states that have released offender cohorts following litigation and court intervention).
15 Robert J. Sampson & Janet Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparitiesin Crime and Criminal
Justice in the United States, in ETHNicrrY, CRIME AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND CROSSNATIONAL PERSPECrwVFS 311 (Michael Tonry ed., 1997).
16 See Blumstein & Beck, supra note 1; DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2000); MAUER, supra note 5; TONRY, supra note 6

(claiming that racial animus in the development of law and policy since the early 1970s has fueled
disparate trajectories of incarceration by race).
17 For a historical look at racial differences in incarceration, see TONRY, supra note 6; Samuel
L. Myers, Jr. & William J. Sabol, Unemployment and Racial Differences in Imprisonment, in THE
ECONOMICS OF RACE AND CRIME 189, 194 (Margaret C. Simms & Samuel L. Myers, Jr. eds., 1988);
(demonstrating average incarceration rates, by decade, of whites and blacks from 1850 to 1980). In
2005, blacks represented 39.5% and whites represented 34.6% of the prison populations. BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2005, at 8 (2006), available at
http:/lwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjslpub/pdflpO5.pdf. In 1993, Blacks represented 49.7% of the state prison
population and 33.7% of the federal population, while Whites represented 45.6% and 63.1%,
respectively. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUST.
STAT. 1994, at 546 (1994). In December 2007, the Bureau of Justice Statistics released a report
stating that from 2000 through 2006, the number of sentenced Black male prisoners increased
slightly, from an estimated 528,300 to 534,200 but that the percentage of African-American men
among all sentenced male prisoners actually declined to 38% from 43%. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
JUST.,
PRISONERS
DEP'T
OF
U.S.
http://www.ojp.usdoj .gov/bj s/pub/pdf/p06.pdf.

IN

2006,

at

7

(2007),

available

at
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2003, the number of African-American inmates in state and federal prisons rose
from 145,300 to 577,100, an increase of 297%. The incarceration rate for African
Americans rose from 554 per 100,000 persons in 1980 to 1,574 per 100,000 in
1996, an increase of 184%.18 The rate increased to 2,531 per 100,000 in 2004, an
additional 61% increase over eight years.' 9 The Sentencing Project, a nonprofit
organization supporting alternatives to prison, studied the demographics of
criminal justice control and recently estimated that nearly one third of young
African-American men between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine are in prison,
jail, or on probation or parole. 20 Additional studies indicate that these numbers
were as high as 40% of young African-American men in the cities of Baltimore
and Washington, D.C. 2 1 The number
of such supervised males exceeded the
22
number who were legally working.
These high rates of African-American involvement with the criminal justice
system clearly are tied to drug offending. Data show that by 1993 drug offenders
accounted for about one quarter of all prison and jail incarcerations, compared to
8.8% one decade earlier, and African Americans have borne the brunt of law
enforcement efforts targeted at illegal drug use and trafficking.23 Examination of
18 Blumstein & Beck, supra note 1, at 22. By comparison, the increase in Hispanic sentenced
prisoners was far greater, at 554%, but their incarceration rate in 1996 was 690 per 100,000 residents,
less than half the rate for African Americans. The number of White prisoners rose by 185% during
this period, and the White incarceration rate rose by 164%, but at 193 per 100,000 residents, it was
less than one-eighth the African-American rate.
19 PRISON

POLICY

INITIATIVE,

U.S.

INCARCERATION

RATES

BY

RACE,

http://www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/raceinc.html (citing BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
PRISON
AND
JAIL
INMATES
AT
MIDYEAR
2004,
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/pjim04.htm). See also BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 9 (2007), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf, (listing rates of 4,789 incarcerated persons for
every 100,000 African-American males and 358 incarcerated persons for every 100,000 AfricanAmerican females).
20 MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECr, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS

AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 3 (1995). See also JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT
THEY ALL COME BACK 24 (2005) ("In 2002, slightly more than 10 percent of African-American men
between the ages of 25 and 29 years old were in prison, compared with 2.4 percent of Hispanic men
and 1.2 percent of white men.").
21 See MAUER, supra note 5.
22

id.

23

See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer & Stephen A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of

Citizen Perceptions, 83 SOC. FORCES 1009 (2005) (presenting survey data showing that perceptions
of racial bias by police are highest among African-American respondents than Hispanic respondents,
but that both groups perceive higher rates of racial bias than do Whites, and that attitudes towards the
legality and acceptance of racially-biased policing practices are largely shaped by citizens' race,
personal experiences with police discrimination, and exposure to news media reporting on incidents
of police misconduct); See also, MAUER & HULNG, supra note 20, at 11; See also TONRY, supra note
6. Drug offenders continue to represent about one-fifth of incarcerations. See BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., PRISONERS IN 2006, supra note 17 at 8; MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING
PROJEcr, A 25-YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 2
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the Bureau of Justice Statistics Surveys of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities
for 1979, 1986, and 1991 reveals that the number of African-American prisoners
incarcerated for drug offenses jumped from 13,974 in 1986 to 73,932 in 1991, an
increase of 429%. 24 By 2003, 133,100 African Americans were incarcerated for
drug offenses, an increase of 80% in twelve years. 25 From 1980 to 1996,
incarceration rates for African Americans for drug offenses increased an average
of 20.3% annually, compared to 12% for Whites and 16% for Hispanics.26 And, as
the numbers of those incarcerated for drug offenses have grown over time, the
racial gap in the demographics of prisoners has widened. 27 Analysis of Bureau of
Justice Statistics data indicates that incarceration for drug offenses of African
Americans with less than a high school education increased from 60 in 100,000 in
1979 to 800 in 100,000 in 1991. The same rates for Whites with a high school
education increased from 6 in 100,000 in 1979 to 20 in 100,000 in 1991.28
Accordingly, one cannot discuss the rise of American imprisonment without a
special look at African-American imprisonment and punishment generally. The
aim of this paper is to make sense of the punishment paradox and the experience of
African Americans by exploring two questions. First, what has been the impact of
the criminalization of African-American males on society as a whole and on the
(2007) (stating that there has been a 1100% increase in the amount of drug offenders in prisons and
jails since 1990 and that 493,800 people are in prison for a drug offense, compared to 41,100 in
1980).
2

MAUER & HULING, supra note 20, at 20.

25

BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2006, supra note 17, at 9.

26

Blumstein & Beck, supra note 1, at 24-25. Note that the number of African Americans

incarcerated in state prisons for drug convictions declined from 134,000 in 1995 to 133,100 in 2003.
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 1996, at 10 (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p96.pdf; BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2005, supra
note 17, at 9. However, this decrease may have resulted in methodological changes, most notably
separation of Hispanics in later data.
27 Among those convicted for drug offenses in state courts, 33% of convicted White
defendants versus 51% of African-American defendants received prison sentences.

MATTHEW R.

DUROSE & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED
FELONS,
1998
STATISTICAL
TABLES,
Tbl.
2.5
(2001),
available
at

http:www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/scsc98st.htm.
Moreover, the cocaine-crack discrepancy has
subverted the consistency that mandatory minimum sentences at the federal level were supposed to
promote; in 1986, the average federal drug offense sentence was 11% longer for African Americans
than for Whites. By 1990, African Americans faced an average sentence that was 49% longer than
White federal drug offenders. See BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FED. JUD. CTR., THE GENERAL EFFECT
OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS 20 (1992). According to a 2003 report by the U.S.
Department of Justice, 44% of African-American inmates in 1997 did not complete high school or
the GED, whereas 27% of White inmates did not complete high school or the GED. BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 6 (2003), available
at http://www.ojp.govlbjs/publpdf/ecp.pdf.
28 See Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug
Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal CriminalLaw, 1 BUFF. CRIm. L. REv. 137,
148 (1997).
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African-American communities from which these men come? Second, what is its
impact on perceptions of African Americans of the legitimacy of our laws and
legal institutions? Our thoughts on answers to these questions will unfold in four
parts.
The first part lays out an explanation of the relationship between deterrence
theory and social control. This part argues that our current "get tough" approach to
crime control ignores the foundations of classical deterrence theory on which the
policy presumably is premised, as classical deterrence theory pays much more
attention to informal controls on individual behavior than our imprisonment policy
does. The second part discusses the social contexts that can either enhance or
detract from formal punishments. In this part we emphasize community social
organization theory, and we demonstrate that African Americans, because they too
often are situated in a community context that is very different from the context in
which non-African Americans are situated, experience both crime and the policy
that attempts to control crime in a unique way.- The third part discusses the
potential paradoxical effects of formal punishment and the unique consequences
for predominantly minority communities where poverty is concentrated. The
fourth part theorizes about reactions to law enforcement in minority communities.
Here we emphasize how the escalation in formal punishment over the last two
decades likely affects the commitment of residents of minority high-crime
communities to government entities. The essay concludes with ideas about
strengthening the legitimacy of law enforcement in distressed, predominantly
minority communities.

II. PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND INFORMAL CONTROLS
While deterrence theories have been implicit in writings about punishment for
centuries, the formal emergence of a deterrence framework for punishment is often
identified with the writings of Cesare Beccaria, an eighteenth-century
criminologist and jurist. In his writings on the control and prevention of crime,
Beccaria elaborated the general proposition that human behavior can be influenced
by variations in punishments. 29 The origins of deterrence theory in fact are
traceable to the centuries preceding Beccaria's essays, when the death penalty was
imposed often and for many offenses, some of them quite trivial.3 0 Prior to this,
popular sentiment regarded the fate of those executed as deserved and morally
unproblematic. Deterrence theory emerged when societies for the first time felt
obliged to provide rational justifications for using the death penalty while rejecting
other forms of judicial violence such as trial by torture, stoning, and the like.
29 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DiscIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); DAvID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY
208 (1990); FRANKLN E. ZIM.ING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 75 (1973).
30 DANE ARCHER & ROSEMARY GARTNER, VIOLENCE AND CRIME IN CROSS-NATIONAL
PERSPECTIvE 118 (1984).
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Although deterrence theory may conceal other ancient themes of punishment,
especially retribution, its utilitarian justification lies in the notion of crime
control. 31

Briefly stated, deterrence theory holds that there is an effective

relationship between specific qualities of punishment (for example, its certainty or
severity), and the likelihood that a punishable offense will be committed.
According to these ideas, increasing the penalty for an offense will decrease its
frequency because deterrence theory conceives potential criminals as rational,
econometrically grounded actors who weigh the qualities and probabilities of
punishment before acting. Such actors would naturally rather avoid punishment
and therefore are discouraged from criminal behavior.
Importantly, the
effectiveness of deterrence is premised on the actor's knowledge of the sanctions
themselves and an ability to weigh not only the severity of the sanction with which
he or she will be met, but also the likelihood of being met with that sanction. More
recent specifications of deterrence elaborate on the rationality of deterrent calculus

by incorporating the reward component of crime. 32 The tension between the risks
and rewards of crime reflects what Jeremy Bentham
characterized as the
33
"hedonistic calculus" people use in making decisions.
Yet, while the massive increase in American punishment is heavily influenced
by deterrence theory,34 modem deterrence research has failed to find consistent
evidence of the deterrent effects of punishment. Empirical evidence on the
31 As distinguished from other forms of social control, deterrence includes a retributive
element, especially punishment in the form of deprivation or pain. See ZaiRING & HAWKINS, supra
note 29, at 33 (agreeing with K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
PUNISHMENT 138, 156 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969); see also Nagin, supra note 12.
32 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and DevelopmentalInfluences
on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 715 (2007)
(showing that risk and reward both contribute to the decisions to continue in or desist from crime);
Bill McCarthy & John Hagan, When Crime Pays: Capital, Competence, and Criminal Success, 79
Soc. FORCES 1035 (2001) (showing that a heightened desire for wealth, a propensity for risk-taking, a
willingness to cooperate, and competence all contribute to both legal and illegal income); Irving
Piliavin, Rosemary Gartner, Craig Thornton & Ross L. Matsueda, Crime, Deterrence and Rational
Choice, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 101 (1986) (showing that the reward component of crime competes with
sanction risks to explain variations in crime rates). See also Jeffrey Fagan & Richard B. Freeman,
Crime and Work, 25 CRIME & JUST. 225 (1999) (showing the role of social and monetary rewards as
offsets to sanction risks in crime decision making); Ross L. Matsueda, Derek A. Kreager & David
Huizinga, DeterringDelinquents: A Rational Choice Model of Theft and Violence, 71 AM. Soc. REv.
95 (2006) (identifying the tension between crime rewards, sanction risks and sanction costs in
explaining desistance from crime among active offenders).
33

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 144

(J. H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Claredon Press 1996) (1789).
34 This is not to say that additional factors such as a concern for incapacitation or retribution
do not also influence our current punishment practice. These factors also clearly have an important
role. The recent rise in "three-strikes" legislation is obviously driven by incapacitation concerns, and
there has been a long-standing role for retribution in sentencing. See, e.g., ROGER W. HAINES, JR.
WITH JENNIFER C. WoLL & FRANK 0. BOWMAN, Im, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 3
(1997) (discussing various rationales for sentencing including retribution in the form of "just
deserts").
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deterrent effects of punishment remains speculative and inconclusive, and the
ability of formal punishment alone to deter crime appears to be quite limited.35
This is hardly surprising if we view punishment and deterrence in the broader
framework of social control. The current primacy of legal controls compared to
other forms of social control in modem punishment practice contradicts classical
thinking on the regulation of social behaviors through normative social processes.36
We contend that modem policymakers have lost sight of what classical
deterrence theorists have accepted for quite some time. Social control theorists
beginning with Durkheim have concurred that social norms are not simply
imposed on individuals by societal structures or processes. Rather, they are
effective only when internalized through formal and informal processes of
socialization, or where formal sanctions are reinforced by informal sanctions.37
That is, where specific deterrent effects are based on the internalization of the
perceived costs of law violation (that is, punishment costs), informal social
controls suggest costs associated with the act itself and both social and
material
38
rewards of crime that are set through neighborhood contexts and norms.
Deterrence theorists have long acknowledged a conditional relationship
between formal and informal sanctions where formal legal sanctions may initiate
societal reactions that complement the legal costs of punishment. 39 Others suggest
that formal sanctions cannot be effective in the absence of informal social
sanctions. Both the direct costs to the offender of legal sanctions (the intrinsic
punitive consequences of arrest) and the social costs of legal sanctions are salient
as controls, although the effects of legal sanctions seem to be indirect and work
through their facilitation of informal social controls. The relationship between
formal and informal sanctions also may be seen as additive-where both sources

35 See, e.g., DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECrs OF CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds., 1978); Philip
J. Cook, Research in CriminalDeterrence:Laying the Groundworkfor the Second Decade, 2 CRIME
& JUST. 211 (1980); Lawrence W. Sherman & Douglas A. Smith with Janell D. Schmidt & Dennis P.
Rogan, Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic
Violence, 57 Am. SOC. REv. 680 (1992).
36 See, e.g., Charles R. Tittle & Charles H. Logan, Sanctions and Deviance: Evidence and
Remaining Questions, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 371 (1973); SOCIAL CONTROL: VIEWS FROM THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (Jack P. Gibbs ed., 1982); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 29.
37 Lewis A. Coser, PresidentialAddress: Two Methods in Search of a Substance, 40 AM. Soc.
REv. 691 (1975); Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and

Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & Soc'W REv. 837 (1990); Piliavin et al.,
supra note 32; Tittle & Logan, supra note 36. See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L. Wilkinson,
Social Contexts and Functions of Adolescent Violence, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 55
(Delbert S. Elliott, Beatrix A. Hamburg & Kirk R. Williams eds., 1998).
38 See Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Wife Assault, Costs of Arrest, and the
DeterrenceProcess, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 292 (1992) [hereinafter Williams & Hawkins, Wife
Assault].
39 Id. See also ZIMRINO & HAWKINS, supra note 29.
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of sanctions combine to deter offenders-or as replacement-wherelegal controls
replace the effects of social sanctions or controls. 4°
Informal social controls that are facilitated by legal sanctions create a coercive
context where social costs are made more salient. But informal controls that rely
on contextualized social processes involve more than the interactions between
victims, offenders and the interventions of legal institutions. Social control
involves the normative processes and ethics of social interaction that regulate
everyday social life, as well as the mobilization of community that occurs in
response to problem behaviors. 4' Thus, informal social controls are effective in
several ways: inhibition of problem behaviors, facilitation of conformity, and
restraint of social deviance once it appears.
Informal social controls are facilitated and perhaps made more salient by the
reciprocity between legal and social controls. Kirk Williams and Richard Hawkins
suggest that community knowledge of an individual's probable involvement in a
violent act is necessary for the activation of informal social controls. 42 Such
knowledge may accrue either from a formal intervention (arrest) or from
information networks independent of the formal sanctioning agents. These
informal, often interpersonal, social controls often involve explicit or remedial
actions to raise the social costs of crime. Williams and Hawkins identify three
types of informal controls and social costs that may interact with formal (legal)
sanctions: social disclosure (commitment costs), relationship costs (attachment
costs), and shame (stigma costs). In other words, the effectiveness of these
controls requires that an offender perceive that his social ties and accomplishments
will be jeopardized by his actions.43 These social costs covary with the person's
"stakes in conformity": persons with community ties including marriage and
employment are more likely to perceive higher social costs should their illegal
behavior be disclosed. 44 This means that social ties are weakened or are more
difficult to establish in neighborhoods with low marriage rates and high
unemployment.
Each of these social costs reflects the social structure of the neighborhood
context where offenders live or work. Commitment costs include the possible loss
of employment chances, educational opportunities, and integration in other social

40 Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 37.
41 Daniel P. Doyle & David F. Luckenbill, Mobilizing Law in Response to Collective
Problems:A Test ofBlack's Theory of Law, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 103 (1991).
42 Williams & Hawkins, Wife Assault, supra note 38, at 305 (showing that the social and
personal costs of violence are greater when there is social disclosure to neighbors or co-workers of an

individual's violent behavior).
41 Id. at 306.
44 See Jackson Toby, Social Disorganization and Stake in Conformity: Complementary
Factors in the PredatoryBehavior of Hoodlums, 48 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sa. 12

(1957).

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:173

contexts such as church or a peer group.45 Attachment costs include the loss of
valued friendships as well as marriage prospects or cohabitational partners. Stigma
is associated with social opprobria and damage to one's reputation from social
disclosure of criminal status. Social cohesion among neighbors, social capital that
regulates behavioral norms across generations, residential mobility, and general
crime and violence rates in neighborhoods will influence the stigma attached to
disclosure of crime. 46
These informal controls are likely to be effective under fairly specific social
conditions. The perceived (social) costs of violence depends on the salience of
these costs to the individual, and the salience depends in part on the individual's
liability to (or "stake" in) the community. If the costs are minimal, however, the
effects of informal controls or formal sanctions will be weak.47 Thus, the material
costs of sanctions and the social censure attached to them will directly influence
the effectiveness of social controls.48 These material factors and the social
networks in which offenders are embedded will reflect the social structure and
social cohesion of their immediate social contexts.
Accordingly, the disparate findings on the deterrent effects of legal sanctions
may reflect the covariation and reciprocity between formal and informal sources of
social control that produce deterrence. Both general and specific deterrence
conceptions suggest that individuals will commit fewer crimes if they perceive that
the benefits of compliance outweigh the punishment costs of legal sanctions and
the salience of these benefits depend on the individual's access to societal rewards,
as well as the premium the person associates with those rewards. The availability
of these rewards varies across communities, reflecting variation in local labor
markets and other economic conditions. Legal punishments interact with both an
offender's human capital and with the social context of his or her daily
interactions, to produce or compromise deterrent effects.49
Both general and specific deterrence should be influenced by the social and
economic context in which individuals weigh the costs of punishment and the
45 Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, PerceptualResearch on General Deterrence: A
Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 545, 565 (1986) [hereinafter Williams & Hawkins,
PerceptualResearch].
46 JAMEs S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990); James S. Coleman, Social
Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc. S95 (1988) [hereinafter Social Capital];
Robert J. Sampson & W. Byron Groves, Community Structure and Crime: Testing SocialDisorganizationTheory, 94 A. J. Soc. 774 (1989).
47 Williams & Hawkins, PerceptualResearch, supra note 45, at 566.
48 Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring Individual Differences and Rational
Choice Theories of Crime, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 467 (1993) [hereinafter Nagin & Paternoster,
Enduring Individual Differences]; Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Personal Capital and
Social Control: The Deterrence Implications of a Theory of Individual Differences in Criminal
Offending, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 581 (1994) [hereinafter Nagin & Paternoster, PersonalCapital].
49 Human capital includes educational attainment, job skills and experience, and other
personal attributes that translate into making an individual a valuable and desired commodity in a
labor market.
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benefits of continued crime participation or law compliance. These costs have
both social and economic dimensions. The material rewards of compliance are
likely to vary with labor market conditions generally and
50 with specific individuals'
positions within either the licit or illicit labor markets.
Thus, understanding the deterrent effects of punishment requires not only
recognition of the dimensions of legal punishment, but also whether legal
punishment is a threat worth avoiding: that there is a job with economic and social
value to lose, that relationships are stable and have value, and that the assailant is
socially embedded in a neighborhood or work context that accords status or metes
out shame and social opprobria. Toby referred to an individual's "stake in
conformity" to predict the effects of legal sanctions on criminality. 51 Thus, the
material costs of sanctions and the social censure attached to them will directly
influence the effectiveness of social controls. 52 These material factors and the
social networks in which people are embedded will reflect the social structure and
social cohesion of their immediate social contexts. To the extent that social costs
concurrently reflect an individual's social bonds within a neighborhood or stakes
in conformity, and long-term labor market prospects available within the city or
region, the deterrent effects of social controls are likely to reflect both the
individual's social class, human capital and the neighborhood's opportunity
structure and social organization.
IL. DETERRENCE AND THE STRUCTURAL CONTEXTS OF PUNISHMENT
There is a consensus in the literature on concentrated poverty that rapid
changes in social and economic structure in the late twentieth century disrupted
informal social regulatory processes. 53 This perspective has been applied not only
to crime, but also to a variety of social ills such as teenage pregnancy, family
disruption and violence, and school dropout. 54 As we will demonstrate below,
50 Jeffrey Fagan, DrugSelling and Licit Income in DistressedNeighborhoods: The Economic
Lives of Street-Level Drug Users and Dealers, in DRUGS, CRIME, AND SOCIAL ISOLATION 99 (Adele

V. Harrell & George E. Peterson eds., 1992).
51 Toby, supra note 44, at 16-17.
52 Nagin & Paternoster, Enduring IndividualDifferences, supra note 48.
53 For summaries on neighborhood social change and crime, see ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. &
HAROLD G. GRASMICK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME (1993); JAMES F. SHORT, JR., POVERTY,

ETHNicITY, AND VIOLENT CRIME (1997); Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent
Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors, in 3
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE 1 (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994);
Jeffrey Fagan, Crime and Neighborhood Change, in UNDERSTANDING CRIME TRENDS 81 (Arthur S.
Goldberger & Richard Rosenfeld eds., 2008).
5 Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Greg J. Duncan, Pamela Kato Klebanov & Naomi Sealand, Do
Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Development?, 99 AM. J. Soc. 353 (1993) (showing
the effects of neighborhood socio-economic status on teenage pregnancy and school dropout after
controlling for individual differences in personality and family structure); Jonathan Crane, The

Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and NeighborhoodEffects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing,
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social structure and context reduce the likelihood that formal punishments based
on a cost-only deterrence model will be effective.
A. Community Social Organization

For most of this century, criminologists have acknowledged the importance of
community in explaining crime rates and activating processes of social control.
Studying communities in Chicago in the 1920s, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay
noted the persistence of elevated crime rates in certain neighborhoods, regardless
of who lived in those areas.55 These were areas of the city near the downtown
business zones, but lacking in residential stability and wealth and generally with
poor quality housing stock. These areas also were traversed daily by people going
from outlying residential areas to job sites either downtown or in the industrial
areas ringing the central city. In a parallel study of street gangs in 1927, Frederick
Thrasher found concentrations of street gangs in many of the same areas, areas that
he called "interstitial zones." 56 Again, these patterns persisted without a racial
concentration. Indeed, Thrasher noted the common dynamics of neighborhood,
crime and gang among German, Czech, Jewish, Polish, Italian, African-American,
and other ethnic groups.57
This research was replicated and extended in several directions in the ensuing
decades. A rich sequence of field studies, many focused on streetcorner life in
poor communities, examined the interaction of persons and places that produced
the types of social instability that often ignited into crime.58 Several gang studies,
especially the work of Short and Strodtbeck in Chicago and Cloward and Ohlin in
New York, showed how the lives of adolescents in gangs were closely linked to
the structure of opportunities and efficacy of informal social controls in their
neighborhoods.59 In Code of the Street, Elijah Anderson further describes how the
temptations of respect and status that one can garner by joining street gangs in
urban neighborhoods can supplant any lessons from families or teachers about the

96 AM. J. Soc. 1226 (1991) (showing the spread of school dropout and teenage childbirth from one
neighborhood to the next as neighborhood conditions worsen socially and economically); see also
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996).
55 CLIFFORD R. SHAw & HENRY D. MCKAY, JuvENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAS 17-

42 (1942).
56 FREDERIC M. THRASHER, THE GANG: A STUDY OF 1,313 GANGS IN CHICAGO 22 (1927).
5'

Id. at 5-25.

58 See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY

AND OPPORTUNITY

(1960); ALBERT K. COHEN, DELINQUENT BoYs (1955); ELLIOT LmBow, TALLY'S CORNER (1967);
JAMES F. SHORT, JR. & FRED L. STRODTBECK, GROUP PROCESS AND GANG DELINQUENCY (1965);
GERALD D. SUTrLES, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM (1968); BETrYLOU VALENTINE, HUSTLING AND
OTHER HARD WORK (1978); WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE, STREET CORNER SOCmTY (1943).
59 See CLOWARD & OHLIN supra note 58; SHORT & STRODTBECK, supra note 58.
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importance of maintaining "decent" values. 6° Recent studies showed the effects of
economic restructuring in cities on gangs and youth violence. 61 Ethnicity and
community were themes of studies focusing on delinquency in Hispanic 62 and
Asian 63 communities.

These studies support the argument that often the social structure of a
neighborhood provides a better explanation of high crime rates associated with a
neighborhood than do the individual-level demographic characteristics of
offenders. This theory of social organization claims that individual-level factors
often correlated with crime-such as low economic status or unemployment--do
not themselves directly impact crime. Instead, the impact on crime of such factors
are mediated by community-level structures, such as friendship networks,
participation in formal organizations like PTAs and churches, and supervision of
neighborhood teen peer groups. Put another way, the structure of the community
in which an individual lives interacts in important ways to either facilitate or retard
that individual's criminal or delinquent behavior.
The premise of social organization theory is that differentially organized
communities will be able to implement varying levels of social control over
residents. Accordingly, "community social organization" is currently defined as
the extent to which residents of a neighborhood are able to maintain effective
social control and realize their common values. 64 Community social organization
directed toward crime control can protect even poor neighborhoods from crime
problems, while communities that are not organized for such control will be more
likely to have crime problems.65
There are three major dimensions of structural neighborhood social
organization: (i) the prevalence, strength, and interdependence of social networks;
(ii) the extent of collective supervision that the residents direct, and the personal
responsibility they assume, in addressing neighborhood problems; and (iii) the
level of resident participation in formal and informal organization such as
60 ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF
THE INNER CITY 102 (1999) [hereinafter ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET].
61 JOHN HAGEDORN WITH PERRY MACON, PEOPLE AND FOLKS: GANGS, CRIME AND THE

UNDERCLASS IN A RUSTBELT CITY (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter HAGEDORN, PEOPLE AND FOLKS]; JAY
MACLEOD, AIN'T No MAKIN' IT: ASPIRATIONS AND ATTAINMENT IN A LOW-INCOME NEIGHBORHOOD
(1987); MERCER L. SULLIVAN, "GETtiNG PAID":YOUTH CRIME AND WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989);

CARL S. TAYLOR, DANGEROUS SociETY (1989).
62 PHILIPPE BOURGOIS, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT: SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO (1995);
JOAN W.
MOORE Er AL., HOMEBOYS (1978); FELIX M. PADILLA, THE GANG AS AN AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
(1992); JAMES DIEGO VIGIL, BARRIO GANGS (1988); Luis J. RODRIGUEZ, ALWAYS RUNNING: LA VIDA
LOCA: GANG DAYS IN L.A. (1993).
63

KO-LIN CHIN, CHINATOWN GANGS: EXTORTION, ENTERPRISE, AND ETHNICrrY (1996).

64

See Sampson & Groves, supra note 46, at 777-82.

65 Ross L. Matsueda, Differential Social Organization, Collective Action, and Crime, 46
CRIME L. SOC. CHANGE 3 (2006); Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls,
Neighborhoodsand Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCI. 918 (1997).
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churches, block clubs, and PTAs.66 By focusing on mediating community social
processes such as the level of supervision of teenage peer groups, the prevalence of
friendship networks, and the level of residential participation in formal
organizations, social organization theory helps to explain the link often noted
between individual-level factors, such as race or socioeconomic status, and crime.
The conditions that characterize poor, minority, inner-city communities fit
into the social organization model of crime. In urban areas, many poor people of
color live in conditions of concentrated poverty and unemployment that predict the
breakdown of community social processes, which in turn produce crime. Unlike
other poor Americans, African Americans who are poor often live in poor
communities. The overwhelmingly poor communities in which many poor African
Americans live are marked by unemployment, family disruption, and residential
instability. 67 Non-African Americans who are poor and live in urban areas are
unlikely to reside in such desolate conditions. 68
This means that poor individuals from different urban communities face
different challenges. In Shaw and McKay's terms, these challenges include family
disruption and urbanization, in addition to low economic status, ethnic
heterogeneity, and residential mobility.69 Whether social control is effective
depends quite directly on the socio-economic factors that set the various costs
attached to informal controls. Employment rates and the social organization of
work will determine whether the possibility of lost employment and education
opportunities are salient commitment costs. Where labor force participation and
wages are low, especially among younger non-white males whose offending rates
are highest, commitment costs are likely to be relatively low. Marriage and
divorce rates, as well as norms of parenting, will influence the social structure of
supervision and neighborhood cohesion, as well as the value and meaning of
intimate relationships, and in turn establish the attachment costs. Attachment costs
will be low in neighborhood contexts where family life is seen as temporary or
impermanent, where attachments of male parents to children are weak, and where
social networks disproportionately involve poor people and are weakened by
Social cohesion among neighbors, social capital that
residential mobility.
regulates behavioral norms across generations, residential mobility, and general
crime and violence rates in neighborhoods will influence the stigma attached to
disclosure of crime.

66 See BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 53; Sampson et al., supra note 65.
67 Some black middle-class neighborhoods have poverty, crime, schooling, and government
services issues that more closely resemble poor ghettos than middle-class neighborhoods. See MARY
PATriLLO-McCoY, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLAss

3

(1999).
68 See Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
UrbanInequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALrrY 37 (John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995).

69 See SHAW & McKAY, supra note 55, at 318-22.
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Moreover, breakdowns in "community social organization" compromise the
extent to which residents in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty are able to
maintain effective social control through the realization of common values. That
is, conditions of structural poverty strain a community's ability to develop
informal social controls. Socially organized or cohesive communities are better
able to engage in informal social control that can lead to lower levels of crime than
communities that are not cohesive. But cohesive communities are able to do so
because such communities are able to realize common values, which can be
continually reinforced in daily community life through conduct and discourse that
center on law abidingness. Such a community can be considered culturally
organized. A community's inability to settle on common values is an indicator of
less organization. Recent urban ethnography helps to make this point.
In his book, Streetwise, sociologist Elijah Anderson describes in great detail
the clash between "decent" values (norms associated with hard work, family life,
the church, and law-abiding behavior) held by some families in the urban
community that Anderson calls "Northton" and "streetwise" values (norms
associated with drug culture, unemployment, little family responsibility, and
crime) held by others. 70 Anderson explains that the diffusion of norms in Northton
was correlated with a weakening in Northton's community-level structures.
Anderson's research reveals that neither streetwise values nor decent values held
sway in Northton, and it is this conclusion that is important for the point we want
to make here. Though many of Northton's residents continued to adhere to decent
values, even as the structural factors that typically predict community cohesion
began to weaken, these residents did so in a world where they were forced to
negotiate simultaneously a significant and rival set of values-the streetwise code
of conduct-in their daily lives. Competition between streetwise and decent
values made it more difficult for law-abiding Northton residents to achieve and
reinforce a common set of values among all residents in the community.
Furthermore, just as most communities seek to impose a norm of law-abiding
behavior, urban neighborhoods have their own set of rules to discourage
disrespecting the community; "street-oriented people can be said at times to mount
a policing effort to keep their decent counterparts from 'selling out' or 'acting
white.' ,,71 The competition between street and decent values, in addition to
making success and survival difficult for many residents, precludes the
development of institutions and values that promote norm-compliant behavior.
Even in middle-class African-American neighborhoods, inculcating lawabiding values can prove difficult because of the intermingling of legal and illegal
elements of the community. For instance, a study of Groveland, an AfricanAmerican middle-class neighborhood in Chicago's South Side, demonstrates that
longstanding community ties and relationships engender sympathy among law70

ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWlSE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE INAN URBAN COMMUNITY 56-

76 (1990) [hereinafter ANDERSON, STREETWISE].
71 ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note

60, at
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abiding people for friends and neighbors on the other side of the law. Indeed, a
gang leader who lives in the area promotes social control: a former supervisor at
the local park discussed how gang members provided security during a
neighborhood event there, and "they were better than the police., 72 More
generally, the presence of a gang has "translated into fewer visible signs of
disorder, less violence, and more social control" because of the alignment of
interests of the gang leaders
and upstanding citizens in the community in keeping
73
Groveland stable and safe.
So one way to assess cultural organization in a community is by looking to
the diversity or fragmentation of community values and norms that are likely to
flow from weak community organizational structures. Both structural organization
and cultural organization in neighborhoods help to explain the crime that occurs in
them. They are critically intertwined. Structural organization of neighborhoods is
like a system of "norm highways." The condition of this infrastructure will either
facilitate or hinder the transmission of community values that can support lawabiding behavior.
Several factors operate to either facilitate or inhibit communities in their quest
for engagement in social control. Three are emphasized here in the subsections
that follow: the relevance of communities of liability to the potential offender; the
social meaning and nature of work in the would-be offender's neighborhood; and
the nature and norms of family relationship in the individual's offender's
community.
B. Communities of Limited Liability
The notion of a community of limited liability was advanced by Morris
Janowitz.74 According to Janowitz, people living in an area have psychological
attachments to, and social investments in, that area.75 The extent and character of
these attachments reflect an individual's view of community, and their social
position in the community. So, raising a family, attending school, and local social
contacts predispose individuals to accept the normative orientation of local
community institutions and social controls. In simpler times, the intersection of
social, economic, and religious life within one community made such liability
quite broad. It also created a mutuality where investments of time and acceptance
of cultural norms were recognized and rewarded with social standing and, in some
cases, assets useful in work and business. Variation in social class and status result
in variations in involvement in social control processes.
72

Mary E. Pattillo, Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers:Managing Crime in a Black Middle-

ClassNeighborhood, 76 Soc. FORCES 747, 757 (1998).
71 Id. at 767.
74 Moris Janowitz, SociologicalTheory and Social Control, 81 AM. J.Soc. 82 (1975).
75 MORRIS JANOWrrZ, ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL 256-69 (1991).
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"Liability" in this context is limited when individuals demand more from their
community than they receive, and they then withdraw in part or whole from the
normative structure of the community when that demand is not fully met. Thus,
failing to achieve social standing, economic return, or simply a level of service,
may limit participation in the regulatory processes of community life that comprise
social control. This may involve withdrawal from the social organization of the
community, or simply from primary group contacts. Whatever the withdrawal, the
sum of this process across individuals implies a lessening of social controls in the
community. The result is that most people have varying levels of involvement in
social control, with a few people unaffected and some deeply involved in the active
processes of control.
Structural changes have attenuated liability in several ways, and increased the
fragmentation of community attachments and participation. In fact, the social
organization of everyday life is quite different today compared to the earlier times
when social control theorists formulated their ideas. For example, patterns of work
among family members involve greater amounts of time out of the home and, in
the case of families with two parents working outside the home, often no adult in
the home. Travel to and from work and other routine activities also involve greater
amounts of time in cars and otherwise away from home. When no adult in the
home has a primary attachment to the residential community, liability is very
narrow and immersion of household members in networks of social control is
minimal.
School busing in many areas disrupts the types of within-neighborhood
attachments that were the foundation of the "functional communities" described by
Coleman and Hoffer, and also attenuates the interlocking social networks fostered
by teacher-parent-student-employer relationships that form a community's social
capital.76 In People and Folks, John Hagedom describes how school busing
attenuated attachments of local youths to their communities, weakened community
controls over schools, and made more efficient efforts by gang members to recruit
young students whose attachment to school and community was attenuated by their
lengthy trips to schools that were far from the locus of the students' sources of
social control.77 These trends contribute to a series of limited or disconnected
liabilities for both adults and children in residential communities, and a weakening
of social controls.
Modem social structural changes exert a strong pull that weakens attachments
to community, reducing liability and decreasing the salience of social controls.
These patterns lessen attachments to residential place, and spread liability across
several sectors with varying degrees of "connectedness" to the larger society. To
the extent that liabilities are consistently high across communities and other
primary group contacts, and these contacts are well-linked to the larger society,
76

See JAMES S. COLEMAN
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social controls remain functional and strong. But when attachments and liabilities
are fragmented, or linked to communities that are detached from larger societal
structures, social controls are unlikely to be effective.
C. The SocialMeaning and Economic Structure of Work
Work performs several functions with respect to social control and reciprocity
with punishment. Work itself is a context of social control that regulates
behaviors.
Or, in the language of the preceding discussion, it provides a
community of liability linked to the larger community in which individuals are
embedded. Work also has intrinsic rewards through social status in small group
interactions, building attachments and making more salient the social dimensions
of punishment "cost." In fact, positive work outcomes have proven to be quite
important in changing behavioral patterns across developmental stages.78 An
econometric, rational choice perspective on crime and work suggests that
individuals will allocate time to criminal behavior when its returns are higher than
other activities, net of perceived punishment costs and estimates of foregone illegal
wages. That is, decisions to engage in crime suggest that offenders find the current
net benefits of crime to be positive, especially relative to punishment costs. Not
only do labor market variables account for an individual's assessment, but factors
including tastes and tolerances for risk, preferences for work, and time allocation
also are part of the decision processes.
Work has changed in many important ways that undermine its functions for
social control, particularly for individuals who have experienced punishment. A
sustained decline in wages for unskilled workers has weakened both attachments to
work and incentives to participate. 79 More importantly, the returns from illegal
work often exceed legal wages for workers with limited human capital or access to
higher wage jobs, and neutralize incentives to avoid crime and possible
punishment.80 The attractions of illegal work are reflected in variables often
unmeasured in quantitative studies on crime and work, especially "tastes and
preferences" that inflate the nonmonetary dimensions of illegal work. 8'
This is an extremely important part of the paradox of imprisonment:
throughout the 1980s, illegal wages increased while legal wages declined for
individuals at the social position of most incarcerated offenders. 82 People with
78
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79 See WESTERN, supra note 5; Fagan & Freeman, supra note 32.
go See Fagan & Freeman, supra note 32.
81 Jeff Grogger, Market Wages and Youth Crime, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 756 (1998); Sudhir Alladi
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82 Fagan & Freeman, supra note 32; Viscusi, supra note 81.
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higher illegal incomes did not possess characteristics conducive to success in legal
labor markets. With punishment becoming socially normative for potential
offenders, punishment costs no longer are contingent and therefore can only
weakly function as a discount on legal wages. And, increasing illegal wages create
an opportunity cost to the decision to engage in legal work: the cost of foregone
illegal wages compete very well with whatever minimal returns could be expected
from legal work.
Crime, especially drug selling, provides economic incentives for young innercity males that raise income prospects in ways that legal markets cannot. Workers
in the illegal economy either are detached from legal work or have been excluded
as a result of the accumulation of legal sanctions. Moreover, their greater
involvement with gangs, organized drug selling, and other illegal activities
suggests their social embeddedness in contexts that close them off from
conventional opportunities. In samples of both drug dealers and general adolescent
populations, illegal and total incomes seem to be highest among those who are
most active criminally, and these differed systematically from others with far lower
criminal involvement. Thus, once involved in illegal work, the incentives to avoid
punishment by foregoing legal wages are very weak.
Recent ethnographic work illustrates how the abandonment of legal work has
been accompanied by shifts in conceptions of work among young men and women
in poor areas. Elijah Anderson describes how young males in inner-city
Philadelphia regard the drug economy as a primary source of employment, and
how their delinquent street networks are their primary sources of status and social
control.83 Participants in the illegal economies in inner cities were engaged in a
variety of income-producing crimes, including drug selling, fencing, auto theft,
petty theft and fraud, commercial extortion, and residential and commercial
burglary. In diverse ethnic communities in cities far apart, young men use the
language of work ("getting paid," "going to work") to describe their crimes. 84 "In
fact, the oppositional culture has ironically dubbed opting to sell drugs as 'getting
legal'."
The confounding of the language of illegal and legal worlds of making money
seems to signal a basic shift in the social definition of work. For the young men
using this language, money from crime is a means to commodities that offer
instrumental value as symbols of wealth and status. Social and economic isolation,
resulting from concentrated poverty and segregation, gave rise to a skewed
emphasis on exaggerated displays of material wealth as a source of status.
83 See ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note 60; see also MARTIN SANCHEZ

JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND AMERICAN URBAN SOCIETY (1991); BoURGOIs,
supra note 62; CHIN, supra note 63; PADILLA, supra note 62; TAYLOR, supra note 61.
m TERRY WILLIAMS, THE COCAINE KIDS 87 (1989); PADILLA, supra note 62; SULLIVAN, supra
note 61; TAYLOR, supra note 61. For example, Felix Padilla describes how gang members in a Puerto
Rican Chicago neighborhood regarded low-level drug sellers in their gang as "working stiffs" who
were being exploited by other gang members. PADILLA, supra note 62, at 129-32.
85 ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET supra note 60, at 114.
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Anderson describes how motivations for the perceived higher returns from illegal
work were influenced by such tastes for quick "crazy" money, and were important
components of decisions to engage in illegal work.86
Much of this illegal work is organized within ethnic enterprises combining
shared economic and cultural interests. For gangs, there is less concern than in the
past with neighborhood or the traditional "family" nature of gang life. Gang
members with limited exits from gang life remained longer in the gang, assuming
leadership roles and manipulating the gang for their own economic advantage
through perpetuation of gang culture and ideology.8 7 Felix Padilla describes how
the new pattern of exploitation of lower-level workers (street drug sellers) in the
gang was obscured by appeals by older gang members to gang ideology (honor,
loyalty to the gang and the neighborhood, discipline, and ethnic solidarity)
combined with the lure of income.
Others also talk about the use of money rather than violence as social control
within African-American and Latino drug-selling gangs-if a worker steps out of
line, he simply is cut off from the business, a punishment far more salient than
threats to physical safety. 88 Drug-selling groups in these studies superficially are
ethnic enterprises but function more substantively as economic units with
management structures oriented toward the maintenance of profitability and
efficiency. The institutionalization of these sources of illegal work, and their
competitiveness with the low status and low income legal jobs left behind after
deindustrialization, combine to maintain illegal work careers long after they would
have been abandoned in earlier generations.
Patterns of illegal work vary in this literature. Some abandon legal work after
a period of employment, others drift in and out of legal work, and a few seem to
choose from the outset exclusive "careers" in illegal work. Sanchez Jankowski, for
example, claims to have found an "entrepreneurial spirit" as the "driving force in
the worldview and behavior of gang members" that pushes them to make rational
decisions to engage in the profitable world of drug sales or auto theft. 8 9 McCarthy
shows that the human and personal capital that promotes conventional success also
promotes criminal success, but the social networks and opportunities available to
many inner-city youth with those skills make illegal work a much more obvious
and feasible option. 9° John Hagedorn describes how gang members drift in and out
of legal work over time, with decisions closely bundled and often reciprocal. 91
Hagedorn claims that the illegal-drug labor market vigorously competes with the

86
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seemingly more "glamorous" opportunities in the legal economy, despite the low
wages, low status, dangerous, and often part-time nature of the illegal work.92
"Rather than dichotomous choice, economic activity for some people seems to
vary over a continuum of legal and illegal 'work'," 93 particularly in inner-city
communities. As low wages for unskilled workers reduce opportunity costs of
punishment and increased incarceration rates reduce the social stigma of
incarceration, the deterrence effects of incarceration abate. 94 Furthermore, crime
wages tend to significantly exceed legal wages. Consistent with a demonstration
that illegal wages are relatively elastic, it is apparent that individuals make rational
choices between legal and illegal work opportunities, even after adjusting for the
risks of law enforcement or violence inherent in criminal behavior.95
For others, the hazards and indignity of low wage and low status legal jobs
discount the returns from legal work. For example, Bourgois claims that drug
dealers who leave legal jobs to embrace the risks and rewards of drug selling are
evidence of a culture of resistance, preferring the more dignified workplace of drug
selling than the low wages and subtle humiliations of secondary
96 labor markets
where racism dominates work conditions and social interactions.
The changes in the structure of employment shape not only job outcomes for
young adults, but the outcomes of early legal problems. Sullivan tells how early
involvement in crimes was normative in three ethnically diverse neighborhoods,
but the outcomes of arrest varied by neighborhoods. 97 White families helped
resolve disputes informally, using family support and job networks to soften the
potential stigma of arrest. With high rates of joblessness, non-white families had
few social buffers or job networks between them and the legal system. Not only
did they lack access to job networks, but their families were of little help when
their income-producing crimes (robberies) evoked official responses. Their
disrupted job networks were unable to mitigate legal problems or ease the schoolto-work transition, contributing to the continuity of criminality and adverse legal
responses.
In contrast, youths in predominantly white neighborhoods were able to make
sometimes difficult but successful escapes from adolescent crime networks.
Hagan links this to processes of social embeddedness that truncate future options
98
and amplify the adverse effects of adolescent entanglements in the legal system.
Several studies have shown how neighborhoods in the past reproduced their
92

Id. See also ANDERSON,
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Fagan & Freeman, supra note 32, at 229.
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94 Id. at 231.
9' Id. at 230.
96
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SULLIvAN, supra note 61, at 199-201.
98 See John Hagan & Alberto Palloni, The Social Reproduction of a Criminal Class in
Working Class London, circa 1950-1980, 96 AM. J. Soc. 265 (1990); McCarthy & Hagan, supra note
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employment patterns in succeeding generations
through networks of job referrals.
99
Today, what is reproduced is joblessness.
D. The Devaluation ofFamily

In deterrence and crime control research, the structure of family life
consistently ranks among the most salient forms of informal social control. For
example, in a study of robbery rates in 150 U.S. cities, Robert Sampson showed
that marriage and divorce rates were the strongest predictors, together with°
unemployment rates, of arrests for robbery among non-white males."
Longitudinal studies also reaffirm the importance of family as a transitional social
role that provides exits from criminality during the developmental transition from
adolescence to adulthood.' 0' The elevated risk of domestic violence in central
cities has been attributed to social isolation, concentrated poverty, and other
structural dynamics that also contribute to violence outside the home in the same
areas. 102 Research on child maltreatment also suggests that there are ecological
concentrations of child abuse that reflect social structure. Variations in child abuse
rates have been traced to variations in community structure including poverty,
residential mobility, and single-parent households. These patterns of social
in urban areas and are also associated with
disorganization often are concentrated
03
high rates of stranger violence.1
Yet structure alone is insufficient to explain variations in betweenneighborhood rates of crime. Within-race, within-income, and within-city
variations in family violence, for example, suggest that the effects of structural and
ecological factors on child abuse and other forms of intrafamily violence are
conditioned by neighborhood processes. James Garbarino and Deborah Sherman
compared two neighborhoods matched on socioeconomic and demographic

99 See William Julius Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of
Public Agenda Research, 56 AM. SOC. REv. 1 (1991); Marta Tienda, Poor People and Poor Places:
Deciphering NeighborhoodEffects on Poverty Outcomes, in MACRO-MICRO LINKAGES IN SOCIOLOGY
244 (Joan Huber ed., 1991).
1ooSee Robert J. Sampson, Urban Black Violence: The Effect of Male Joblessness and Family
Disruption,93 AM. J. Soc. 348 (1987).
101See SAMPSON & LAUB, supra note 78.
102See Jeffrey Fagan, Social Structure and Spouse Assault, in THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF
CRIME AND JusTcE 209 (Brian Forst ed., 1993).
103 See Claudia J. Coulton et al., Community Level Factorsand Child MaltreatmentRates, 66
CHILD DEV. 1262 (1995); James Garbarino, A PreliminaryStudy of Some Ecological Correlates of
Child Abuse: The Impact of Socioeconomic Stress on Mothers, 47 CHILD DEv. 178 (1976); James
Garbarino & Ann Crouter, Defining the Community Context for Parent-Child Relations: The
Correlates of Child Maltreatment, 49 CHILD DEV. 604 (1978); Susan J. Zuravin, The Ecology of
Child Abuse and Neglect: Review of the Literatureand Presentationof Data, 4 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS
101 (1989).
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°4
characteristics but that varied dramatically on the rates of child maltreatment.'
Through interviews with families and neighborhood informants, they identified
neighborhood risk factors for child abuse that reflected the urban social context of
these neighborhoods rather than their socioeconomic status. These risk factors
included what they termed "social impoverishment," a milieu characterized by
family social isolation, insubstantial
social networks, and weak social supports
05
among family caretakers.
The implications of these dynamics suggest that family interactions will exert
strong influences on social control in socially impoverished neighborhoods.
Accordingly, risk factors for several antisocial and problem behaviors seem to
converge in central cities: interpersonal violence, child maltreatment, social
disorganization (high rates of residential mobility, poverty, divorce or family
disruption, and female-headed families with children), and weak social networks
leading to social isolation. To the extent that these processes describe what
Kasarda and Janowitz call a "systemic" model of social disorganization, they are
symptomatic of what more recently has been termed "structural" forms of social
disorganization-focusing less on the spatial or even geographic
dimensions of
1°6
community than on the structure of social networks within them.
The interaction of community, family and structure form an ecological
dynamic of social control, representing what Anderson calls the interconnected
realities born of the difficult social conditions in poor communities.,0 7 The
dimensions of family relevant for social control include the social networks within
which families and individuals are embedded, and the social capital among
families within the community.

1. Social Controls
The structure and meaning of family life influence both informal and formal
social controls. If the social costs of punishment are tied to the threat of
relationshiploss, then these costs are discounted in neighborhoods with high rates
of family disruption and dissolution or with low marriage rates. Marriage itself
becomes a less desirable option for both men and women in an economic context
where young men are systematically excluded from stable employment and
consigned to persistent poverty. 10 8 The decline in family-sustaining jobs denies

104 James Garbarino & Deborah Sherman, High-Risk Neighborhoods and High-Risk Families:
The Human Ecology of Child Maltreatment,51 CHILD DEV. 188 (1980).
105Id. at 196.
They also noted that high-risk families may drift toward high-risk

neighborhoods, creating a compositional or aggregation effect. Id.
106 John D. Kasarda & Morris Janowitz, Community Attachment in Mass Society, 39 AM. SOC.
REv. 328, 329 (1974).
107 ANDERSON,

STREETWISE, supra note 70, at 112-37.

108 See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE

UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (discussing the pool of marriageable men).
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many young men in urban areas, especially areas where labor force participation
has declined, the opportunity to pursue an economically self-sufficient family.
For young males, the declining interest in marriage as a long-term goal skews
male-female relationships and the definition of gender roles regarding manhood.
In this political economic context, sexual prowess is one of the few opportunities
left to gain and display personal power and accomplishment.'1 9 Their exploitation
of women, coupled with their weak economic future, make these young men less
desirable marriage partners for women, leading to more transient sexual
relationships and an increasing prevalence of female-headed families with
children.' 10 Ulf Hannerz noted that in considering marriage, "there is an awareness
among ghetto dwellers that they may be literally 'taking a chance on love.' "'11 If
marriage is a protective factor against criminal participation, then the risks of
sustained criminal involvement grow with the decline in marriage tied to the
declining economic fortunes of young men.
More generally, social control is also affected by neighborhood dynamics.
Stigma costs are low for punished offenders when there is little cohesion among
neighbors, or when neighbors know little of each other or feel little responsibility
for what happens in their neighborhoods. When liabilities are attenuated, and
stakes in the neighborhood are low, there is little inclination among neighbors to
directly cast their sanction on the punished offender. Neighbors also have less
motivation to intercede personally, to react to crimes generally, or to develop and
express social norms against that behavior.
2. Social Networks and Social Isolation
The importance of social networks, especially those involving families, in
12
informal social control is illustrated by ethnographic literature on communities.
For example, kinship networks generally are more prevalent among lower social
class families as well as non-white families; higher socio-economic status families
tend to rely on occupational networks rather than kin-based networks. Among
low-income African-American families, these networks depend on regular

109 See

generally ANDERSON, STREETWISE supra note 70; GEOFFREY CANADA, FIST, STICK,

KNIFE, GuN (1995); WILLIAM OLIVER, THE VIOLENT SOCIAL WORLD OF BLACK MEN (1994);
KENNETH POLK, WHEN MEN KILL (1994).
110 In this context, women may see young men as burdens or risks rather than as assets in
achieving the passage of setting up their own households. ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 70, at
134-37.
111ULF HANNERZ, SOULSIDE: INQUIRIES INTO GHETTO CuLTURE AND CoMMuNITY 71 (1969).
112 See generally ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 70; MARY PATrILLO, BLACK ON THE
BLOCK: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND CLASS IN THE CITY (2007); PArrILLO-McCoY, supra note 67;
Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Gang in the Community, in GANGS IN AMERICA 241 (C. Ronald Huff

ed., 2d ed. 1996).
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interactions among network members, close living13arrangements, and shared
resources such as child supervision, food, and shelter.'
Also, the intricate relationships among natural extended families or ritual kin
relations (compadres) is a sociocultural process central to socialization in Puerto
Rican neighborhoods. In these networks, the family serves as the cornerstone of
the culture, defining and determining individual and social behaviors. Relatives by
blood and ceremonial ties, as well as friends of the family, are linked in an intricate
network of reciprocal obligations that promote collective sharing of both
misfortunes and good times. Among adolescents from families with low income,
absent fathers, or troubled family relationships, the value of familism may be
invoked by parents or other family members to restrain their involvement in
antisocial behavior. 14a But in middle-class African communities that exhibit
cohesive extended-family networks, having numerous adults does not always
translate into better supervision or familial control of youth; in situations where
grandparents assume a parental role, generational differences that inhibit
communication combined with grandparents' limited financial resources
and
5
energy levels can limit the exercise of strong controls on youth behavior.'
As with other social processes, social isolation affects micro-social
(individual) interactions and communities. Residential mobility has far-reaching
consequences for disruption of social networks. To the extent that networks are
composed of family relationships, the decline in two-parent families in poorer
neighborhoods signals a narrowing of the kinship networks that form around
marriage and children. Other social networks have become increasingly comprised
of people with low incomes or low occupational status in central cities as middle
income non-whites and whites have moved away from traditional neighborhoods.
For those left behind, especially non-whites, access to family-sustaining work
becomes more difficult and the networks increasingly reflect the behaviors and
norms of those marginalized within closed neighborhoods. The risks and
motivations for crime increase as the protective networks of kinship weaken within
113

See

CLAUDE S. FISCHER, To DWELL AMONG FRIENDS: PERSONAL NETWORKS IN

TOWN

AND

CITY (1982); CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN (1974).
114 Familism has been defined as a value system in support of the family which emphasizes the
bonds and obligations between relatives and the duty to help and express concern for them. See
LLOYD H. ROGLER & ROSEMARY SANTANA COONEY, PUERTO RICAN FAMILIES IN NEW YORK CITY:

INTERGENERATIONAL PROCESSES (1984). Ties between families are cemented by the establishment of
compadrazco (godparent-godchild) relationships. PADILLA, supra note 62. The godparents at
baptism or sponsors at confirmations are the padrinos of the child and become co-parents with the
natural parents. Witnesses at a wedding become compadres of the married couple. See Joseph P.
Fitzpatrick, Drugs and Puerto Ricans in New York City, in DRUGS N HISPANIC COMMUNITIES 103

(Ronald Glick & Joan Moore eds., 1990). These serious relationships involve reciprocal obligations
that often are as demanding as natural family relations. Within this milieu, the well-being of the
individual is subordinated to the welfare of the family or kinship network. See also Nancy A. BuschRossnagel & Luis H. Zayas, Hispanic Adolescents, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOLESCENCE 492 (Richard
M. Lemer, Anne C. Petersen & Jeanne Brooks-Gunn eds., 1991).
115 PATrILLO-MCCOY, supra note 67, at 74-75.

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:173

central cities. Intimate relationships suffer from the weakening of social networks,
the frustration of material deprivations, and behavioral influences from other
jobless families in the neighborhood.16
Increasing residential segregation and isolation of residents from the social
and economic institutions that represent mainstream society weaken the influence
of the larger society on interpersonal behaviors.' 1 7 The absence of more
conventional patterns of family interactions, patterns otherwise facilitated by
working families embedded in stable kinship or friendship networks, facilitates the
transmission and reification of more violent patterns. The rare and skewed
contacts of neighborhood residents with people in other social contexts (such as
work or commercial transactions) allows norms and attitudes supportive of
violence in intimate relationships to prevail over non-violent norms. In turn,
young people considering coupling or marriage are more likely to be exposed to
violent interactions between adult intimates. Eventually, these norms are
internalized as their transmission becomes more efficient. These are the processes
that create "cultural disorganization" as a byproduct of social disorganization.
These themes are evident throughout the ethnographic literature on inner-city
life going back to the 1930s, which consistently notes the routine incidence of
family conflict and disruption within segregated, socially isolated and disorganized
communities." 8 Elliott Liebow, for example, described violent transactions
between men and women that often followed struggles over (scarce) money. He
concluded that "the widespread violence between streetcorner husbands and their
wives seems to be more a product of persons engaged in an always failing
enterprise than merely the' 19'style' or 'characteristic feature' of streetcorner
husband-wife relationships." "
Liebow went on to describe male violence toward spouses that is
contextualized in their frustration over failing to meet their wives' legitimate
expectations for herself and her children, and a context for "angry aggression"
among household members.120 Marriage becomes an occasion for failure; the
116 See
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inability to support a family results in losses of self-esteem and social status among
neighbors and transfers marital power to the woman. 21 The tension between
maintaining the public image of "breadwinner" and a dominant role in the home on
the one hand, and the economic and social problems in achieving that role on the
other, create strains within marriages that often lead to violent conflicts and
breakup. It also creates a cautiousness in coupling and marriage that fosters a high
rate of divorce or dissolution.
Within socially isolated neighborhoods where structural conditions foster
marital relations that are transient and frequently conflicted, young people form
definitions of marriage or male-female relations that devalue family life.
Adolescents and young adults may be more likely to develop norms that work
against family life and lower both attachment and commitment costs attached to
intimate relationships. When marital instability becomes normatively valuable, the
costs of criminal participation attached to family go to zero. To the extent that
these processes are shaped by the social structural factors-especially segregation,
residential mobility and concentrated poverty-a system of values may emerge
regarding expectations of conduct. These may become what Liebow calls a
"shadow system of values" that influences socialization and social development. 22
3. Social Capital
The third dimension of family that addresses social control is social capital.
James Coleman defines social capital as the structure of relations among people,
particularly relations that lead to social action "making possible the achievement of
certain ends.' 23 It fosters the processes by which behavioral norms are set and
regulated and by which they are transmitted from one generation to the next within
families and across kinship and social networks. But the idea of social capital
requires that these relationships transcend families, and encompass the broader sets
of relations between families and across generations, as well as between families
and institutional networks: parent-teacher relationships, religious affiliations, and
economic relationships that cross generations and legal institutions.124
Accordingly, the influences of social capital are greater than any that could
occur within a single family or kinship network. And the relationships within a
single network or family alone cannot produce social capital. 25 Deficits in social
capital are symptomatic of communities with limited social networks and weak
121
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cohesion among their residents. To the extent that networks are attenuated, they
may become ineffective at controlling behaviors and sustaining norms.
Social capital accrues when individual behaviors occur in multiple contexts
and are subject to multiple reactions. The young person experiencing marital
conflict may encounter reactions from family members, work-related
acquaintances, or neighbors. If these relationships exist within fairly dense
networks of acquaintances, obligations, and expectations, the reactions (or
sanctions) of people within these networks to those experiencing problems will be
more consistent and have greater salience.
The extent to which social capital is depleted under conditions of social
disorganization and structural deficits should be fairly obvious. 126 Not only are
kinship and economic networks subject to breakup under structural conditions of
unemployment, poverty, and residential mobility, but so too do demographics
work against the formation of social capital. The concentration of female-headed
families with children compromises the effectiveness of cross-family
intergenerational relationships.
To some degree, these relationships depend on modeled behaviors based on
exposure of young people to adults. The depletion of the "marriage pool" of adult
males certainly threatens social capital. The limited contacts between males of
younger and older generations in these contexts not only truncates the learning and
mentoring relationships that develop but also weakens the informal social controls
that regulate the behaviors of young males and females. These relationships teach
and reinforce lessons about intimate relationships and coupling. They also provide
important gateways for connections to the wider society through jobs, social ties,
and friendship networks. And the ability of young males and females to achieve
their expectations for intimate relationships and for their individual lives is
enhanced through involvement in interlocking networks of commitments and
obligations that offer support for child care, job prospects, and rewarding social
interactions. Accordingly, the depletion of social capital helps sustain social
isolation, promotes cultural disorganization, and weakens informal social control.
IV. THE PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF FORMAL PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION

We return, then, to the paradoxical effects of imprisonment in the United
States in the late twentieth century. Offending rates increased, rather than
decreased, in the face of escalating punishment costs of crime: the tripling of
imprisonment rates, the lengthening of sentences, and the reduction of punishment
thresholds relative to the severity of crimes. Using a framework of deterrence and

126 But social capital also may fail to accrue even under more benign structural conditions,

particularly in neighborhoods marked by infrequent contacts between families or limited crossgenerational and cross-family integration within the contexts of schools or other institutions.
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social control, several factors can be implicated in the declining deterrent effects of
punishment.
First, punishment has had unanticipated iatrogenic effects with respect to
crime and negative effects on legal work. Several studies have shown that
incarceration during adolescence and early adulthood has negative effects on
employment and positive effects on crime in later adult years. 127 Both longitudinal
and ethnographic studies place delinquency before unemployment in the sequence
of developmental events over the life course. The assignment of a criminal record
places concrete and lasting barriers to future employment, and for former inmates,
reduces their choices with respect to avoiding crime and entering positive social
roles. Increasing rates of incarceration and lower thresholds for imprisonment
beginning in the 1980s have attenuated access to legal work that already was
complicated by considerations of race, human capital, location, and discrimination.
Second, fundamental changes in the structure of work for marginally
employed persons have lowered expected returns from legal work. The deterrent
argument for punishment, at its simplest, suggests that the costs of punishment will
exceed the returns from illegal work. However, declining wages and job mobility
for unskilled workers combine to reduce incentives to avoid punishment,
regardless of illegal incomes.' 28
Third, the corollary effect of widespread perceptions of increasing returns
from illegal work--crime-undermine deterrence. That is, the costs of crime in
foregone legal wages are no longer worth avoiding.
Fourth, punishment costs are discounted by cultural shifts, such as cultures of
opposition and defiance of the goals of punishment. 129 This has occurred in spite
of, or perhaps because of, objective increases in their certainty and severity. In
fact, the increasing reliance on state-administered rather than informal social
controls, contributes to the escalation of defiance and the delegitimization of
punishment.

127 See, e.g., Fagan & Freeman, supra note 32.
128See, e.g., Hagan & Palloni, supra note 98 (on the embeddedness of criminal offenders in

spatial and social contexts where the perceptions of returns from legal work are overwhelmed by
normative perceptions of the limitations and futility of legal work). See also BouRGots, supra note
62; ANDERSON, STREETWISE, supra note 70; ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note 60 (on the
devaluation of legal but low-wage work).
129The formation of oppositional cultures has been described by Elijah Anderson. See
ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note 60. The process suggests that the isolation of
marginalized communities has skewed perceptions of legal or conventional success so that
achievement in school or the legal workplace is identified with an oppressive dominant economic and
cultural order. Young people who pursue such success are themselves isolated and denied social
standing in street networks in areas of social isolation and concentrated poverty. Defiance of the
goals of punishment is part of this culture. See Sherman, supra note 11. Intrinsic emotional rewards
from behaviors defying the goals of punishment outweigh whatever material rewards may be
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A vicious cycle has thus been formed. The hopelessness and alienation
many young inner-city black men and women feel, largely as a result of
endemic joblessness and persistent racism, fuels the violence they engage
in. This violence serves to confirm the negative feelings many whites
and some middle-class blacks harbor toward the ghetto poor, further
and the code of the streets in the
legitimating the oppositional culture
30
eyes of many poor young blacks.'
We see this in the increasing likelihood and severity of punishment that has
approached normative levels, compromising the moral component of punishment
and in turn the logic of deterrence.
Finally, rapid changes in social structure have altered social organization in
specific communities, compromising the informal social controls that reinforce
legal controls including punishments. Informal social controls are the regulatory
processes of social groups and institutions that convey the rewards and social
opprobria for prohibited social behaviors. The salience of informal controls
reflects the evaluation of negative social sanctions or rewards as meaningful and
worth avoiding, that the status attached to societal acceptance itself is worthwhile,
and that the groups allocating informal punishments have legitimacy and moral
standing that merit efforts to obtain their acceptance. Structural changes-the
concentration of poverty, declining marriage rates, high residential mobility
combined with low political participation-have weakened the informal controls
of social institutions such as schools and the supervision and cohesion of
neighborhood residents. Ultimately, whatever the messages of punishment, their
reinforcement through informal (extralegal) mechanisms has been weakened, and
deterrent effects once again compromised.
So far we have explained how structural changes in many communitiesespecially high crime communities-have been altered in ways that make it more
difficult for residents to exert social control. Because of these changes, we have
argued that the effectiveness of deterrence-based formal punishment is likely to be
undermined. In this section we focus on the experience of residents of high-crime,
minority communities and explain that not only is the increase in formal
punishment not likely to be effective for the reasons we have already explained, it
is also likely to exacerbate the precursors to low levels of social control such as
family disruption, unemployment, and low economic status. When these negative
consequences are visited on a class of offenders that are not geographically
dispersed but that are instead spatially concentrated, it is possible that the policy
that leads to the consequences confounds its own crime-fighting ends.

130 Elijah

Anderson, The Code of the Streets, AT. MoNr-LY, May 1994, at 83, available at

http:/lwww.theatlantic.con/doc/printl199405/code-of-the-streets.
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A. FamilyDisruption

High rates of imprisonment of young African-American men and women
translate into many broken families in African-American communities. It is
difficult to measure how family ties and connections and individual psyches may
be devastated when family members and close friends are removed from
communities. Although quantification of emotional harm is practically impossible,
some judgments about the ways in which high incarceration levels affect the
vitality of families, the life chances of children left behind, and the economic
circumstances of African-American communities are possible.
First, imprisonment contributes to the already high percentage of families
headed by single African-American women. 3 1 Because the mortality rate for
African-American men is somewhat higher than that for African-American
women, the female to male ratio is already quite high in some African-American
communities. 32 High levels of incarceration of African-American men add to this
ratio. Increases in the ratio of African-American women to African-American men
are likely to lead to a lower probability of marriage and formation of two-parent
families. 33
Second, the removal of young adults from the community means fewer adults
to monitor and supervise children. Inadequate supervision leads to increased
opportunities for children to become involved in delinquency and crime.1 34 The
increasing rate of African-American women sentenced to prison presents an
additional hazard to poor African-American communities and especially to the
children growing up in them, though the absolute numbers are small compared to
the numbers of African-American men imprisoned. 135 Bureau of Justice Statistics
data for the year 2006 shows that African-American women were incarcerated in
131Fifty-five percent of African-American family households are headed by women compared
to seventeen percent for Whites. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED
STATES 62 (1995), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/l/gen/95statab/pop.pdf.
132 See WILLIAM A. DARITy, JR. & SAMUEL L. MYERS, JR. WITH EMMErT D. CARSON &
WILLIAM SABOL, THE BLACK UNDERCLASS: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON RACE AND UNWANTEDNESS 148-51

(1994) (explaining that mortality rates for black men outpaces that of black women partly because of
high homicide rates among young black men).
133 This argument assumes, of course, that the marriage prospects of African-American women
are substantially determined by the ratio of African-American men available to African-American
women. This assumption is not without foundation. American interracial marriage is still relatively
rare-about two percent of all marriages in 1994. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 131, at 55.
Moreover, interracial marriage is least likely for African-American women. See id. (chart showing
that in 1994 there were 96,000 more black husband/white wife interracial couples than white
husband/black wife couples).

134 See Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Urban Poverty and the Family Context of
Delinquency: A New Look at Structure and Process in a Classic Study, 65 CHILD DEV. 523, 531-33,

538-39 (1994).
...BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2006, supra note 17, at 6 (estimating that there were

28,600 African-American women incarcerated in state and federal prisons in 2006).
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state or federal prisons at a rate of 148 per 100,000, whereas the rate for white
women was 48 per 100,000.136 Because African-American women often are the
primary caretakers of children in poor communities, there is a growing risk that
children are in danger of losing both parents to the criminal justice system. 37 As a
result, these children face a very high risk of future criminal involvement.
Moreover, communities will suffer a loss because each additional incarcerated
adult erodes the important community adult/child ratio that is a predictor of greater
neighborhood supervision.
B."Low Economic Status and Joblessness
In addition to the negative consequences that high rates of imprisonment
undoubtedly have on the amount of emotional support and caregiving available to
the families of incarcerated individuals, high imprisonment rates are likely to have
a detrimental effect on the economic well-being of families in impoverished
neighborhoods. The prevalence of low economic status and unemployment among
families predicts low levels of community social organization. Given the well38
established association between poverty and families headed by single women,
there can be little doubt that higher rates of incarceration of African-American men
will contribute to the deepening poverty in the African-American community.
Recent Census estimates indicate that an astonishing 22.3% of African-American39
families have incomes below the poverty level compared to 8.1% for whites.
Families of the incarcerated necessarily lose whatever financial support the
offenders could have given them. 4 Though the majority of those incarcerated are
136 Id. at 7. Note that the number of African-American women in prison declined from an
estimated 32,000 in 2000 to an estimated 28,600 in 2006. Id. at 6. Furthermore, those figures
increased for white women from 33,300 to 49,100 during this period. Id.
137A 2000 Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Incarcerated Parents and Their
Children, estimated that Black children were nine times more likely than White children to have a
parent in prison. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., INCARCERATED CHILDREN
AND THEIR PARENTS 2 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf. See also
John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children,
Communities, and Prisoners,26 CRIME & JUST. 121 (1999).
138 See WILSON, supra note 108.
139 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 42 (2007),

available at http://www.census.govlprod/2006pubsl07statab/pop.pdf. These numbers have also been
constant over time with respective rates standing at 31.3% and 9.4% in 1995, 32.3% and 9.7% in
1983, 28.1% and 6.6% in 1973. Id. at 48; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 131, at 484, available at
http://www.census.govlprodll/gen/95statab/income.pdf.
140An interesting statistic from the 1991 Survey of Prison Inmates supports an inference that
families are worse off economically after an adult family member is incarcerated. Out of all inmates
surveyed whose families were receiving public assistance at the time of the survey interview, fiftyone percent of those families were not receiving public assistance prior to the inmates' arrests.
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SURVEY OF STATE PRISON INMATES, 1991, at 3 (1993), available at
http:/lwww.ojp.govlbjs/pub/pdf/sospi9l.pdf.
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ill-educated and although many have shallow work histories, 141 many still manage
to contribute to their families financially prior to being imprisoned. Some
participate in the "informal economy," running unlicensed cab businesses, car
repair businesses, and unlicensed street vending businesses, to name a few, in
order to assist their families. 42 And some of them engage in illegal activity in
order to contribute to their families. A recent RAND study documents the
importance of drug selling as an economic activity for young black males in the
District of Columbia. This study found that over half of the men sampled provided
43
monthly support to a child, spouse, girlfriend, family member, or friend.
Another study of Chicago Public Housing found that many public housing
residents rely on gang members for financial support to supplement public
assistance benefits. 144
Most drug offenders do not remain in prison forever, 45 and we should expect
some of the negative financial consequences that families suffer when a
contributor is sent away to prison to be alleviated, if only in part, when the
offender is released. However, the negative consequences to the community are
not likely to be remedied simply by the release of drug offenders. In fact, release
of convicted drug offenders back into their communities may worsen the social
organization of poor communities even while the convict's return may improve the
financial situation of his family.
The vast majority of formerly incarcerated men return to their homes in the
inner city, where job prospects for everyone already are glum, even if they are
aware of better job prospects elsewhere.146 In 1997 the Bureau of Labor Statistics
141 According to the 1991 Survey of State Prison Inmates, 65.1% of all state prison inmates

have less than a high school education. Id. Moreover, in 1991 32.7% of all state prison inmates were
not employed at the time of arrest. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 131, at 217, available at

http://www.census.gov/prod/l/gen/95statab/law.pdf.
142

See, e.g., Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Cleaning Up Chicago's Public Housing: A Critique Of

"Sweeps" and Enforcement-Based Approaches, in EIGHTH ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
DRUG POLICY REFORM, 'THECRUCIAL NEXT STAGE: HEALTH CARE & HUMAN RIGHTS" 5 (1994)

(explaining the entrenched informal economy in Chicago's public housing).
143

See PETER REUTER, ROBERT MACCOUN & PATRICK MURPHY, RAND, MONEY FROM CRIME: A

STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS OF DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C., 70 (1990), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R3894.pdf.
144 See Venkatesh, supra note 112, at 251-52.
145 For offenders convicted and sentenced in U.S. District Courts in 1992, the average sentence
length was 21.8 months for a possession offense and 83.8 months for a trafficking or manufacturing
supra note 131,
at 214, available at
offense.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/gen/95statablaw.pdf.
A survey of 38 states found the average
maximum sentence length to be 53 months for possession and 61 months for trafficking. Most

telling, however, are the statistics on time served. In federal prisons, average time served totaled 8.2
months for possession and 34.7 months for trafficking, while for the states the averages were 15 and
18 months respectively. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
supra note 17, at 555-56, 574.
146 See john

a. powell,

Race and Poverty: A New Focus for Legal Services, 27

CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 299, 303 (1993) (documenting the fact that imprisoned men usually return to
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estimated the unemployment rate in central cities to be 7.3% compared to 4.0% in
suburbs of central cities and 4.9% in the balance of the country; however,
researchers have documented jobless rates as high as 60% in some hyper-poverty
areas in central cities. 147 This latter statistic is important. Unlike the term
unemployment, which assumes an individual is a participant in the formal labor
market, joblessness refers to those who have completely withdrawn from the labor
force-they are not working nor are they actively looking for work.
Of course, legitimate job prospects for ex-convicts are likely to be worse than
the already weak prospects for inner city residents generally. As we noted above,
few people with the typical convict's credentials would be competitive in today's
service-oriented economy, which emphasizes educational attainment and
training. 148 Thus, a released convict likely will have even fewer employment
opportunities than he had before he was imprisoned, so he will inevitably
contribute to the already high rates of unemployment in the central cities when he
returns home-unemployment that erodes community social organization.
Professor Bruce Western, in his 2006 book, Punishment and Inequality in
America, provides statistical evidence for this proposition. 49 Western presents
detailed information about hours worked and wages for those never incarcerated
and compares those figures to hours worked and wages for those individuals both
before and after incarceration. 150 Although the largest intraracial wage gap is that
between whites who are never incarcerated and whites who end up in the criminal
justice system at some point, with average hourly wages of $14.70 versus $11.14,
African Americans who have been incarcerated experience the largest drops in
earnings. Black offenders earned $7,020 in the year after reentry versus $13,340 in
the year before their incarceration.15 1 'These raw figures suggest that incarceration
damages the employment prospects of men with criminal records, but it is also
clear that men bound for prison, even before they are incarcerated, do worse on the
job market than the rest of the population."'' 52 A statistical analysis intending to
isolate the effect of incarceration (rather than one also reflecting labor market
differences that might result because individuals who go to prison have fewer
opportunities in the legitimate labor market) demonstrates that "[mien with prison
records are estimated to earn 30 to 40 percent less each year."' 53 More ominously,
the impoverished urban communities they came from, even if better jobs are located elsewhere).
147See BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., ISSUES 1N LABOR STATISTICS (1998), available at
http://ww.bls.gov/opub/ils/pdflopbils27.pdf. See also WIsoN, supra note 54, at 19.
148Professor Randolph Stone has said that a felony conviction for an African-American youth
is an "economic 'life sentence.' " Randolph N. Stone, Juvenile Justice: A Dream Deferred, 8 CRIM.
JUST. i, 50 (1994).
149 WESTERN, supra note 5, at 116.

150 Id. at 115-16; stated in 2004 nominal dollars.
l"' Id. at 115.
152 Id.
151Id. at 120.

2008]

PUNISHMENT, DETERRENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

209

in terms of advocates' preference for ensuring that reentering individuals establish
a permanent presence in the legitimate job market, there are issues of rapid job
turnover and insufficient wage growth.
Moreover, Western cites research by Professor Devah Pager demonstrating
pernicious discrimination among reentering individuals, particularly African
Americans. 154 The study involved "randomly assign[ing] resumes to pairs of
specially trained black and white job applicants. The resumes showed identical
work experience and education, but one of the two indicated recent employment in
prison and listed a parole officer as a reference."' 55 After having these applicants
interview for 350 jobs in Milwaukee in 2001, Pager found that Whites without a
criminal record were offered second-round interviews from employers 34% of the
time (versus 17% for those who said they were in prison); the corresponding rates
for Blacks were 14% and 5%. 156 Western also discusses legal disqualifications
from employment in certain licensed or professional occupations, the erosion of
job skills during incarceration, the "signaling" effect of untrustworthiness that
incarceration may convey to potential employers, and the57 erosion of social and
community bonds that often help individuals to find a job.1
is
Furthermore, Jeremy Travis argues that mass incarceration 158
counterproductive because it may have criminogenic effects on prisoners.
Imprisonment not only weakens a person's access to legal work, as both Western's
and Pager's research has shown, it also strengthens his connections to criminal
networks. 159 Thus, upon re-entry to their communities, prisoners pull away from
legal work and "push toward the secondary labor market of day labor and part-time
jobs and toward illegal income."' 16
One might think that the argument that a released convict will contribute to
high rates of unemployment upon re-entry is undercut by the fact that many
convicted offenders did not participate in the formal labor force prior to
incarceration. Under such conditions, it may be difficult to see how a convict's
return to his neighborhood would substantially worsen the neighborhood's social
organization. In fact, one might even predict that many families would be better
off once an offender is released because the newly-released offender is able to
contribute to his family financially, or in other ways, as he was not able to do in
prison. Notwithstanding the fact that the unemployed released convict may be able
154

See

DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS

INCARCERATION (2007); Devah Pager, Two Strikes and You're Out: The Intensification of Racial and
CriminalStigma, in BARRIERS To REENTRY? THE LABOR MARKET FOR RELEASED PRISONERS INPOSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA 151 (Shawn Bushway, Michael A. Stoll & David F. Weiman eds., 2007).
155WESTERN, supra note 5, at 112.
156id.
151 Id. at 112-13.
158 TRAvis, supra note 20, at 166.
159 Id.

160 Id.
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to enhance his family's welfare when he returns home, it is important to see that
release of convicted drug offenders back into poor communities has the potential to
erode a community's social organization even if the proportion of unemployed
individuals in the community is essentially unchanged.
The widespread human capital in a community facilitates the formation of
networks and relationships among individuals that form the backbone of the
structural components of social organization; however, the status of "convict"
severely compromises the released felon's ability to expand his human capital. A
released convict may perceive further investment in human capital to be useless
because he may understandably reason that sinking money and time into education
and training will not overcome the stigma of a felony conviction on a job
application. When he makes the decision to refrain from further investment, he
weakens existing relationships he has with people who will be less likely to depend
on him because his ability to provide them with benefits through interaction is
compromised. Additionally, the individual who decides not to make further
investments in education, skills, and training cuts himself off from potentially
useful relationships with others who have no incentive to form relationships with
him.
It is true that many law-abiders in the neighborhoods we are concerned with
here possess low levels of human capital, as poverty often is correlated with low
levels of education. By distinguishing convicted drug offenders from law-abiders,
we do not mean to imply that it is a fairly simple proposition for residents of poor,
urban communities to invest in human capital by acquiring better educations and
vocational skills. However, we do mean to argue that, to the extent that it is
difficult for anyone in poor communities to do so, it is that much harder for a
released convict; the marginal effect of this additional hurdle may make a large
difference in the potential of the convict to form important networks with his
neighbors. The basic point is this: all unemployed populations are not equal, and
any incremental increase in the proportion of convicts among the unemployed
population of the ghetto portends incrementally worse consequences for the vitality
of the community.
To emphasize the point that increases in the proportion of the community's
population of those with the status of "convict" potentially erodes the social
organization of a neighborhood, consider the likely change that ascription of the
status will produce in the level of an individual's interaction with law enforcement
or in that individual's level of civic participation. A released convict obviously
will be less likely than other law-abiding neighborhood residents to engage
positively with local law enforcement. Of course, many non-convicts in poor,
minority communities may not welcome engagements with law enforcement. The
point, however, is that released convicts are even less likely than others to do so.
Voting is another indicator of participation in the life of a community. In ten
states, convicts are unable to vote upon the completion of their sentences,' 6' The
161 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRMINAL DISENFRANCHSEMENT LAWS AcRoss THE UNITED
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burden of these laws falls disproportionately on African Americans and Hispanics:
approximately thirteen percent of African American men cannot cast votes, and in
three states, the percentage rises to twenty because they are either currently or
formerly incarcerated. 62 Restoring the vote to ex-felons is complex and
burdensome, with the result that many never regain the right to vote.' 63 Voting is
connected to other forms of political participation such as membership in formal
organizations, an important structural component of social organization. 64 These
arguments, together with those in the previous paragraph, illustrate that changes in
the percentage of individuals with the status of "convict" in the community
potentially affect the prevalence of friendship networks in a community and the
levels of participation by neighborhood residents in formal organizations.
Finally, release of incarcerated drug offenders is unlikely to remedy the first
precursor to social organization disruption referred to earlier-family disruption.
Even while a released convict may contribute to his family in small and helpful
ways, it is unlikely that release will lead to strengthening of family ties and
aversion of family disruption. With dismal employment prospects, the released
convict may not be viewed as a favorable "marriage prospect."'' 65 If the released
convict was married prior to incarceration, his now-impaired economic

STATES (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download file_48642.pdf. In 25
states, felons can regain the right to vote only after completion of probation, parole or prison
sentences, and often only upon application. See also MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, TaE SENTENCING
PROJECT, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-

STATE RESOURCE GUIDE Tbl. 7 (2006); THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
LAws

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES,

available

at

http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/fd bs-fdlawsinus.pdf (finding that
5.3 million Americans, including 1.4 million African-American men, are temporarily or permanently
disenfranchised because of a felony conviction); Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L. J. 537, 538-40
(1993) (finding that about four million Americans, disproportionately African-American, have lost
their right to vote because of a criminal conviction).
162 Among prison inmates in Rhode Island, African-American inmates outnumber Hispanics
by two to one, and Whites by six to one. See ERIKA WOOD,RESTORING THE RIGHT TO VOTE 8, 21
(2008),
available
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page//Democracy/Restoring%20the%20Right%20to%20Vote.pdf.
163 JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 252-54 (2006) (showing that among 155,127 men and women released from
prison in Mississippi between 1992 and 2004, only 107 petitions to restore their voting rights were
approved, and that the potential African-American electorate in Kentucky has been reduced by
almost 24% during the same period). See also Jason DeParle, The American Prison Nightmare, 54
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 33 (Apr. 12, 2007).
16

See SIDNEY VERBA, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY:

CIvIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITCs (1995).
165 WILSON, supra note 108, at 81-92 (discussing the "male marriageable pool index," the ratio
of employed civilian men to women of the same race and age-group, and showing that the decline in
the proportion of employed black men to women of the same age tracks the decline in the formation
of black two-parent households).
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circumstances likely will place strains on his relationship. I6 Higher numbers of
families headed by single women seem inevitable even after incarcerated men are
released. Also, to the extent that a single woman has managed to create a stable
home life while the father of her
67 children was incarcerated, his release may lead to
disruptive domestic violence. 1
This analysis should demonstrate that a law enforcement strategy that depends
on the high prevalence of long sentences to generate benefits may ultimately
backfire. The strategy could likely lead to family disruption, unemployment,
weakened informal social controls among neighbors, and lower levels of civic
participation.' 68 Thus, to the extent that the strategy produces crime reduction
benefits, it does so only by exacerbating the preconditions of social organization
disruption.
V. THE IMPACT OF FORMAL PUNISHMENT AND PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY

How do the impacted African-American communities view the substantial
increase in punishment over the last two decades? The answer to that question is
complex. African Americans generally, and those who reside in high-crime
neighborhoods
especially, have multiple reasons to hold complex views about the
69
issue.'

As noted earlier, the level of African-American imprisonment is greatly
affected by sentencing policy directed at drug offending, and one undisputed
consequence of the War on Drugs is the fact that disproportionate numbers of
African Americans (poor African Americans in particular) have been convicted
and imprisoned for drug offending. President George H. W. Bush's Attorney
General, William Barr, touted this piece of data claiming that "[t]he benefits of
increased incarceration would be enjoyed disproportionately by black
Americans."' 170 However, assessing the extent to which African Americans
enjoyed the claimed benefits of the policy is difficult.' 71 Drug selling and drug use
166See Sampson, supra note 100.

167 See Anthony E.O. King, African-American Males in Prison:Are They Doing Time or is the
Time Doing Them?, 20 J. Soc. & Soc. WELFARE 9 (1993) (explaining how prison life can make
former inmates prone to violence).
168See James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Commentary, Assessing the Effects of Mass
Incarcerationon Informal Social Control in Communities, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 267 (2004)
(offering empirical evidence of the connection between community disruption and mass
imprisonment and concluding in part that the long-term result of mass incarceration is to reduce its
overall effectiveness in reducing crime rates.). See also Tracey L. Meares, Mass Incarceration:Who
Pays the Pricefor CriminalOffending?, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PuB. POL'Y 295 (2004).
169 See generally Meares, supra note 28.
170 See TONRY, supra note 6, at 36.
171In 1985, approximately

11.4% of current cocaine users were Black-roughly the

percentage of African Americans in the population. See John P. Walters, Race and the War on
Drugs, 1994 U. CI. LEGAL F. 107, 135 (1994). In 1988, 15.3% of current cocaine users and 27.3%
of frequent cocaine users were Black. Id. at 136. By 1991, 21.8% of current cocaine users were
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unfortunately are prevalent in modem urban ghettoes where many poor African
Americans reside, suggesting that many African Americans could benefit from
federal and state crackdowns on drug offenders. At the same time, it is impossible
to ignore the fact that "[tihe young black men wreaking havoc in the ghetto are still
[considered] 'our youngsters' in the eyes of many decent poor and working-class
black people who are sometimes their victims. ' 17 2 In light of such beliefs, it is
difficult to be confident that African Americans, though supposedly beneficiaries
of prevalent and long sentences for drug offending, wholeheartedly support
them. 173 In short, while African Americans disproportionately suffer problems
associated with drug use and marketing, they also suffer the negative consequences
associated with the current drug-law enforcement regime.
So far we have explained reasons to be skeptical of the benefits flowing from
the escalation of formal punishment to achieve deterrence of crime-especially
drug offending. There are also reasons to believe that the racial asymmetry
generated from high levels of punishment of inner city offenders is likely to
ultimately undermine the goal of crime reduction. The race-specific reasons that
undermine the ability of a law-and-order program to effect substantial crime
reduction in inner city communities fall into three general categories: stigma,
linkedfate, and multiple roles.

Black, and 41.2% of frequent cocaine users were Black. Id. at 137. Although the numbers of all
current and frequent cocaine users have declined since 1985, the numbers of White current and
frequent cocaine users declined most dramatically. The result is an increasingly disproportionate
representation of Blacks among illegal drug users, though White users still remain the majority of
users. These data could suggest that if the War on Drugs was responsible for declining drug use, it
was less effective among Blacks than Whites. This argument depends, however, on an assumption
that the rate of increase of use among Blacks and Whites during the period in question was the same.
If the rate of increase of use among Blacks was faster than that among Whites, these data could also
suggest that the War on Drugs was just as effective among Blacks as it was among Whites-perhaps
even more effective. The 1997 NationalHousehold Survey on DrugAbuse seems to show a different
picture. See OFF. OF APPLIED STUD., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERv., 1997 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD
SURVEY
ON
DRUG
ABUSE,
available
at
http:llwww.oas.samhsa.govlnhsda/l1997Main/nhsdal997mfWeb-39.htm#Table4.5.
172 Glenn C. Loury, Listen to the Black Community, PUB. INT. 33, 35 (1994).
173 For instance, Bobo and Johnson conducted a study to see the effect racial cues would have
on support for capital punishment and the crack-cocaine disparity. While the inclusion of racial cues
did not have much effect on support for the death penalty, support for higher sentences for crack was
halved among both African Americans and Whites when a question about support for the differential
was preceded by a comment about the racial disparities between crack and cocaine users. The survey
results demonstrate a tension in the African-American community, whereby concerns about the
fairness of a differential policy must also confront concerns about the criminality that crack use
produces in their communities. See Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment:
Black and White Americans' Views on the Death Penaltyand the War on Drugs, 1 Du BOiS REV. 151,
167 (2004); see also Meares, supra note 28.
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A. Stigma
It appears fairly clear that the disproportionate involvement of minorities
(African Americans in particular) in the criminal justice system generally
stigmatizes all minorities, whether they are categorized as law breakers or law
abiders. 174 This point is an unremarkable one. Less obvious is the link between
the stigmatization of minority law-abiders and their commitment to law abiding
conduct. By referring to "commitment to the law" here, we adopt a normative
view of compliance whereby a social group promotes respect for authorities and
commitment to law as a key value to pass on to other members of the group.
Stigmatization of minority law abiders through law enforcement programs that
generate extremely racially disproportionate incarceration rates can undermine
commitment to the law by minority law abiders by fostering a perception of
illegitimacy of government among members of the stigmatized minority group.
Scholars have noted that discrimination undermines minority citizen
perceptions of fairness of the criminal justice system. 175 Although crime rates have
declined significantly since the early 1990s, the rates for African Americans
remain higher than the rates for both Whites and Hispanics. In the aftermath of the
riots that decimated urban areas throughout the country in the mid-1960s, the
Kerner Commission characterized how policemen in the ghetto become "the
tangible target for grievances against shortcomings" that pervaded law
enforcement and criminal justice systems, and that the police and society must
"take every possible step to allay grievances that flow from a sense of injustice and
increased tension and turmoil."' 176 But in the intervening years, any substantial
political support for extensive policies to remedy the underlying causes of the riots
dissipated.
Glenn Loury offers a compelling historical rationale for the racial discrepancy
in attitudes toward the legitimacy of legal outcomes. He argues that "the social
meaning of race emergent in American political culture at mid-nineteenth century
was closely connected with the slaves' dishonorable status," and consequently
"that black Americans are exceptional in the extent to which remnants of this
174

See JODY

DAVID AMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF

BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); Dinesh D'Souza, Myth of the Racist Cabbie, NAT'L REV., Oct. 9,

1995, at 36; Walter E. Williams et al., The Jeweler'sDilemma, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 10, 1986, at 18.
175 See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC

COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair
by Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 Soc.
RES. 445 (2006); Bobo & Johnson, supra note 173; Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of
ProceduralJustice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing,37 LAW & Soc'Y REv.
513, 519-21 (2003) (suggesting that police treatment of people in the community has stronger effect
on legitimacy than quality of police performance); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRiM. LAW 231 (2008).
176 THE KERNER REPORT: THE 1968 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL

DISORDERS 300 (1988).
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ignoble history are still discernible in the nation's present-day public culture."'
He explains how the pervasive societal stigmatization of African Americans can
further marginalize the community 178from the institutions and norms that
"mainstream" society purports to value.
As Loury explains, the "social otherness" engendered by centuries of racial
subordination infects social meaning, most notably the paradigm of how society
conceptualizes policies and situations, if not the attitudes individual Americans say
they hold. 179 He illustrates the effect of social meaning by noting how "[t]he
youthful city-dwelling drug sellers elicit a punitive response, while the youthful
suburban-dwelling drug buyers call forth a therapeutic one.' 80 Racial stigma, as
evidenced by the development of urban ghettos, "helped create the facts that are its
own justification."'' 8 Despite the pervasive evidence of minority skepticism of the

fairness of the criminal justice system and law enforcement authorities, very few
scholars have
linked these perceptions to predict behavior of minority group
82
members.'
Certainly, widely shared perceptions of unfairness, ill treatment, and racial
animus can erode popular support for law and the moral and social norms that
underlie them. 183 These are the moving parts in a legitimacy story and would
apply to most social groups. But to understand exactly how legitimacy may
support or corrode beliefs in and compliance with the law, these linkages need to
be spelled out in more precise theoretical detail. What, then, is legitimacy, what
177 GLENN C. LouRY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY

69 (2002).

178 Id. See also Glenn C. Loury, Why Are So Many Americans in Prison? Race and the
Transformation of
Criminal Justice, BOSTON
REv.,
July
2007,
available at
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR32.4/articleloury.php [hereinafter Loury, Americans in Prison].
179 LOuRY, supra note 177, at 70-71.
180 Id. at 71.

l"l Id. at 78.
182 For notable exceptions, see Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as

Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J. 593 (1996) (arguing that perceptions of unfairness in the system support a
theory of defiance whereby Black men especially become alienated from "mainstream" values,
ultimately reject them as illegitimate, motivating lawbreaking); John Hagan, Carla Shedd & Monique
R. Payne, Race, Ethnicity, and Youth Perceptionsof CriminalInjustice, 70 AM. Soc. REv. 381 (2005)
(showing that adolescents who perceive discrimination by criminal justice agents are more likely to
engage in law violation); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1399 (2005) (showing
that persons who perceive laws as unjust were more willing to flout unrelated laws, and their
willingness to disobey extended unrelated laws in their everyday lives such as traffic violations, petty
theft, and copyright restrictions). See also TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 34-35 (2006)
(studies cited in charts on these pages identify a connection between political alienation and support
for revolutionary behavior).
183 Hagan et al., supra note 182; see, e.g., David S. Kirk & Andrew V. Papachristos, Legal
Cynicism and the Framing of Neighborhood Violence: Implications For 'Neighborhood Effects'
Research 2 (Dec. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081894
(showing that elevated rates of legal cynicism in neighborhoods explain "homicide net of
neighborhood structural conditions and collective efficacy", and "the persistence of homicide in
certain Chicago neighborhoods during the 1990s when homicide declined drastically city-wide").
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are its antecedents, and from what experiences or norms does it develop? The term

is used widely and promiscuously in legal scholarship, moral philosophy, and
political science but generally without consensus as to its definition, how it
accrues, or its influence on normative action.184
Writing about the challenge of legitimacy in the development of the European
Union, David Beetham and Christopher Lord define legitimacy as the moral or
normative standing of political authority.' 85 They characterize legitimate regimes
as "rightful" governments where "those subject to political authority ...

have an

obligation to obey it.''186 However, they are concerned less with the mechanisms
by which political order and obedience are sustained or break down, than with
explaining differences between countries 8or7 group differences in the relationship
that each holds with a shared government.
Following Beetham, we view legitimacy as the perceived obligation to
comply with both civil and criminal law and to defer to decisions of legal
authorities. 88 Legitimacy is a socially and morally salient belief to which social
authorities can appeal to gain public deference and cooperation.' 89 It both assumes
18 See generally Brian E. Butler, Posner's Problem with Moral Philosophy, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 325, 332 (2000) (book review); Williamson M. Evers, Social Contract:A Critique, 1 J.
LIBERTARIAN STUD. 185 (1977), available at http:/lwww.mises.orgjournals/jlsll3/1-3-3.pdf;
William G. Merkel, Parker v. The District of Columbia and the Hollowness of OriginalistClaims to
PrincipledNeutrality, 18 GEO. MASON U. Clv. RTs. L.J. 251, 262-63 (2008); Note, The Charming
Betsy Canon, Separation of Powers, and Customary InternationalLaw, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1215,
1216 (2008); Arthur Isak Applbaum, Legitimacy in a BastardKingdom, (Ctr for Pub. Leadership,
Working
Paper,
2004),
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/leadership/images/stories/ksg/PDF/Publications/applbaumworkingpaper.
pdf;
Lawrence
Solum,
Legal
Theory
Lexicon:
Legitimacy
(2007),
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/07legal-theory--4.html.
185 David Beetham & Christopher Lord, Legitimacy and the European Union, in POLrrICAL
THEORY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 15, 15 (Albert Weale & Michael Nentwich eds., 1998).
186 DAVID BEETHAM

& CHRISTOPHER

LORD, LEGrriMACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

1

(Longman, 1998)
187 Id. at 20-25.
See, e.g., MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 212-15 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (1968).
188See, e.g., DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGrHMATION OF POWER 15-16 (1991) (defining
legitimacy along three dimensions, including rules that are justified "by reference to beliefs shared by
both dominant and subordinate"); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological Perspectives]
(discussing ways in which legitimacy facilitates state exercise of power because individuals view
authorities as morally or normatively appropriate); TYLER, supra note 182, at 25 (stating that
"legitimacy exists when the members of a society see adequate reason for feeling that they should
voluntarily obey the commands of authorities"); Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra at 378
("One aspect of values-obligation-is a key element in the concept of legitimacy. It leads to
voluntary deference to the directives of legitimate authorities and rules."). But see WEBER, supra
note 186. See also Tyler & Fagan, supra note 175.
189 HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORrTY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1990); TYLER, supra note 182; TYLER & Huo,
supra note 175; John R. P. French, Jr. & Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN
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and requires that citizens perceive an obligation to obey legal authorities and also
hold trust and confidence in authorities. Legitimacy, then, may be strongest when
law and legal actors express moral and social norms that are widely shared by both
dominant and subordinate social groups. In the context of this essay, legal actors,
especially the police-because they are a common and frequent point of contact
with the state for most citizens-can gain cooperation and compliance by
inculcating the popular perception that their actions and decision are legitimate.
This argument builds upon a long line of theory that argues for the centrality of
legitimacy to the effectiveness of state actors.190
Psychologist Tom Tyler advances a normative view of compliance with the
law that promotes the fact that people tend to comply with the law because they
believe that authorities have the right to dictate to them proper behavior-that they
believe that authorities are legitimate.19' The normative view of compliance, in
contrast to an instrumental one, emphasizes the importance of the social influence
of groups on individuals. Individuals respond to normative factors differently
from the way they respond to rewards and punishments. In contrast to the
individual who complies with the law because she is responding to externally
imposed punishments, the individual who complies for normative reasons does so
because she feels an internalobligation. 192 It is "[tihe suggestion that citizens will
voluntarily act against193their self-interest [that] is the key to the social value of
normative influences."'
Although the link between perceptions of legitimacy of government and
compliance with the law has long been discussed in the theoretical and empirical
95
94
social science literatures,' empirical support for this point has been equivocal.

SocIAL POWER 150, 155-65 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1959) (identifying six dimensions of
organizational power, including legitimacy, that can produce compliance among subordinates: reward
power (perceived ability to give positive consequences or remove negative ones), coercive power
(perceived ability to punish those who not conform with your ideas or demands), legitimate power, or
organizational authority (perception that someone has the right to prescribe behavior due to election
or appointment to a position of responsibility), referent power (through association with others who
possess power), expert power (distinctive knowledge, expertness, ability or skills), and information
power (control of information needed by others in order to reach an important goal). See also TYLER,
supra, at 170-78 (suggesting psychology of legitimacy wherein people obey authorities and
institutions that they trust).
190See BEET-AM, supra note 188. See also WEBER, supra note 187.
191See TYLER, supra note 182, at 25. Professor Tyler also notes that people may also comply
with the law because they believe that the law dictates behavior that accords with their own sense of
personal morality. Tyler warns that personal morality is "double-edged" because it may or may not
comport with the dictates of legal authorities. Id.
192Id. at 24.
193

Id.

194Id. at 24-27 (summarizing research on compliance with legal norms and legitimacy of legal
institutions).
'9'Id. at 27.
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Work by Tyler nearly two decades ago systematically explored the connection
between citizen perceptions of fairness and legitimacy and compliance, and this
work supports the claim that extreme racial asymmetry in punishment can
undermine compliance with law among minority groups. Tyler's work shows that
compliance with the law is strongly related to a citizen's perceptions of legitimacy
of government.' 96 His study of the experiences, attitudes, and behavior of a
random sample of citizens in Chicago demonstrates that perceptions of legitimacy
independently contribute to compliance. Moreover, Tyler shows that this has a
greater impact on compliance than fear of sanction, or on the particular outcomes
of the interactions of citizens with legal or other government institutions.' 97 More
recently, Tyler and Fagan have replicated these results in New York, 98
focusing
specifically on the interactions of citizens with police and criminal actors.'
Professor Tyler, along with Tyler and Fagan, show that experience-based
assessments of both distributive fairness' 99 and procedural fairness 2°° matter a great
deal to perceptions of legitimacy and compliance, especially among African
Americans. 20 ' In Tyler's 1990 research, he surveyed residents of Los Angeles
neighborhoods of varying ethnic and racial composition to assess the relationship
between procedural justice, distributive justice, and the acceptance of decision
outcomes by legal actors. For Hispanics, their acceptance of decisions and
satisfaction with the decision-maker was mediated by their experience at the hands
of legal actors, specifically "quality of treatment" and "procedural justice." The
outcome itself was unrelated to their acceptance and favorable rating of that
outcome. For African Americans, however, both procedural and distributive
justice were closely tied to acceptance of decisions. Moreover, procedural justice
was important only in conjunction with distributive justice, not by itself.20 2 In
other words, for African Americans, "fairness" in the process is not easily
separated from equity in the outcomes of the process.
Professor Tyler and his colleagues confirmed this finding in a national survey
on views of the courts. Overall, the quality of treatment by legal actors was the
196 Id. at 64 ("People who regard legal authorities as legitimate are found to comply with the
law more frequently.").
197 Id. A caveat is in order. Professor Tyler explored adherence to laws that would not be
considered by most to be serious crimes if broken-speeding and parking violations, shoplifting, and
the like. Tyler's focus is on compliance with the law by those generally considered to be lawabiding.
198 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 175, at Tables 4-6, 254, 257, 259.
199 See TYLER, supra note 182, at 73 (explaining that the concept of distributive fairness
emphasizes the ways in which "citizens evaluate public policies by examining the extent to which
they distribute government benefits and burdens fairly"). See also Tyler & Fagan, supra note 175.
200 "According to theories of procedural justice, citizens are not only sensitive to what they
receive from the police and the courts but also responsive to their own judgments about the fairness
of the way police officers and judges make decisions." TYLER, supra note 182, at 73.
201 TYLER & Huo, supra note 175.
202 Id. at 134.
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most significant predictor of a favorable view of the courts. Both process issues
and outcome fairness are important for all racial and ethnic groups in their
interactions with legal authorities to assess procedural justice. 2° 3 However,
African Americans and Hispanics are less concerned than Whites with process
issues, while Whites are more likely to rely on their assessments of process in
estimating satisfaction with legal decisions. Minorities emphasize outcome issues
more in assessing procedural justice, though the differences are small and the
process issues are overall more important influences on their willingness to accept
legal decisions. 204 Procedural justice weighed far more than distributive justice in
the evaluation of the courts among Whites and Hispanics. African Americans
were unwilling to place trust in courts and legal actors without trust in the fairness
of substantive outcomes.
The disproportionate representation of minorities in prisons is linked to
notions of distributive and procedural justice in a fairly obvious way. If members
of a minority group do not believe that the prison sentences that members of their
group receive are fairly distributed, then they may conclude that the policy that
produces the unfair distribution is illegitimate. 2 5 If minority group members reach
this conclusion because the law and order program produces asymmetrical
incarceration rates, then Tyler's model suggests that members of the group are less
likely to comply with the law.
Since then, further empirical and ethnographic evidence has tended to bolster
that contention. In 2006, the New York Police Department conducted 506,491
documented stops, with arrests or summonses resulting less than one-tenth of the
time; moreover, since African Americans represented 53% of those stops while
constituting 24% of New York's population, it is clear that law-abiding African
Americans disproportionately endure adversarial contacts with the police.20 6 Such
interactions with the police can profoundly shape how individuals view police
legitimacy and thereby how they subsequently interact with law enforcement.
While New York adopted zero-tolerance policing under the "broken windows"
theory of criminality, recent research has questioned the connection between
disorder and crime; such zero-tolerance plans therefore have the perverse effect of
Id. at 154.
204 Id. at 155.
203

205 Empirical work indicates that Blacks are much more likely than Whites to believe that
courts are much too harsh on criminal offenders. See, e.g., Meares, supra note 28.
206 GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND SAFETY AND JUST., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW

YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 10, 19 (2007), available at

http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical-reports/2007/RANDTR534.pdf. While the study is able to
narrow the racial gap by considering a number of other factors, African Americans are nevertheless
subject to stop and to frisking more than white pedestrians in New York. Moreover, among those
stopped, police were slightly more likely to frisk African Americans than Whites in similar
circumstances. Id. at 33-35. Even if the NYPD's stop practices do not exhibit any unwarranted
racial disparities, the higher likelihood of negative police interactions for African Americans may
impact their perceptions of police legitimacy.
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antagonizing 20 minority
communities and undermining the legitimacy of law
7
enforcement.
A recent study establishes the effects of attitudes of the New York Police
Department's legitimacy on behavioral compliance with the law. 20 8 Legitimacy is
primarily predicated on beliefs in procedural justice, with lesser effects for
distributive justice and police performance. Legitimacy is fundamentally based
upon the fairness of police interactions, rather than upon instrumental perceptions
of police efficacy, and the strength of these attitudes affects compliance with the
law, cooperation with police, and the willingness to further empower law
enforcement. 20 9 Those findings are further bolstered by a forthcoming analysis
illustrating that personal experiences with the police that are perceived as
procedurally just enhance people's210trust and confidence in the police even where
negative personal outcomes result.
The development of skepticism regarding law enforcement begins during
childhood and adolescence and exhibits behavioral responses comparable to those
of adults. A comparative study of youth in two Brooklyn neighborhoods
demonstrates declines in perceptions of law enforcement legitimacy as youth
become older, and that these perceptions affect compliance and cooperation with
law enforcement. 21' The process of legal socialization, whereby children develop
conceptions of the legitimacy of the law, often as a result of their own interactions,
affects compliance and cooperation with law enforcement.212 Similar results were
demonstrated by an empirical study of Chicago youth; the study demonstrated that
police contacts can engender perceptions of law enforcement injustice and
illegitimacy.213 Interestingly, the effect of police contacts is less among AfricanAmerican youth than Latino youth, likely because of African Americans'
"experience of the expected," while African Americans who live in integrated
environments are more likely to distrust police, perhaps
214 because the racial
disparities in law enforcement are likely to be more salient.
The stigmatization of law-abiding minority group members that is intimately
related to racially disproportionate incarceration and minority group perceptions of
(il)legitimacy connects up with this discussion. Disproportionate incarceration of
African Americans is an important "race-making" factor.21 5 Just as the existence
207 Robert Sampson, Neighbourhood and Community: Collective Efficacy and Community

Safety, 11 NEw ECON. 106, 110 (2004).
208 Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 175, at 520.

209 Id. at 530-31.
210 Tyler & Fagan, supra note 175.
211 Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 Soc.
JUST. RES. 217, 236 (2005).
212 Id.
213 Hagan et al., supra note 182.
214 Id. at 397-99.

215 This term is borrowed from Professor David James, who has written of the ghetto as a
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of ghettoes (the ultimate referent of the consequences of race, place, and crime)
can define and stereotype African Americans in a negative light, prisons in which
half of the inmates are African Americans define and stereotype African
Americans as criminal offenders. Both ghettoes and predominantly AfricanAmerican prisons are physical constructs that sustain and nourish an AfricanAmerican identity tied up with criminal and deviant behavior and in opposition to
"mainstream" (read "law-abiding") American identity. Ghettoes and prisons
institutionalize race, and because race becomes the marker of the identity that is
created by place, it necessarily affects all African Americans whether or not they
reside in inner city neighborhoods of concentrated poverty or in prisons.
As a result, many African Americans must endure suspicion by both
minorities and non-minorities alike, poor service, refusals of service, and perhaps
most importantly for our argument here, erroneous arrests and accusations by the
police. In neighborhoods where a decent, law-abiding adolescent must conform to
the oppositional culture of the streets, "to the extent that he takes on the
presentationof 'badness' to enhance his local public image, even as a form of selfdefense, he further alienates himself in the eyes of the wider society. '21 6 In the
minds of some law enforcement agents, black skin is considered a factor to use to
decide whether an individual should be considered a criminal suspect.2 17
For obvious reasons, erroneous arrests are likely to undermine the particular
individual's assessment of the legitimacy of the state. But even more important for
this discussion, erroneous arrests affect how an individual subjected to them
discusses the legitimacy of government with his or her friends. This effect is
critical to the normative view of compliance with the law. Erroneously arrested
individuals may not argue vigorously that government deserves no respect;
however, such an individual is probably much less likely than she would otherwise
be to vigorously and positively promote government. This is a negative
consequence for a norm-driven view of compliance, particularly in communities
where the community structure predicts higher crime levels. To see why, consider
again the discussion of cultural organization in a community.
Weak structural social processes facilitate diversity in values and norms
governing law-abiding conduct, as Elijah Anderson's work demonstrates.
Residents of many inner-city communities must negotiate the clash of inconsistent
value systems that dictate acceptable behavior. When the strength of signals

"race-making situation." David R. James, The Racial Ghetto as a Race-making Situation, 19 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 407, 420-28 (1994).
216 ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note 60, at 112.

217 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 140-41 (1997) (citing numerous
examples of individuals stopped by police most likely because of race); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops,
and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997) (discussing the problem of black motorists being
stopped disproportionately due to race); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY.
544 (1997).
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supporting government legitimacy wanes, we should expect the level of
commitment to compliance to wane as well. Signals supporting law-breaking
behavior, on the other hand, even while fewer in number than those supporting
law-abiding conduct may be very strong. This phenomenon is likely connected to
the relative strength of social networks among community sub groups. Teen peer
groups, for example, may not be large in number, but the norms that are generated
and transmitted among members of these cohesive groups may be very strong
compared to the norms generated and transmitted among more numerous but
weakly connected adults. This means that adults interested in transmitting law
abiding norms to youths in a community through intergenerational transfer may
lose in the norm transmission competition to teen peer groups.2 18 Tyler's work
shows that when there are fewer positive signals of government legitimacy within
a group to support compliance, opinions of peer groups will take their place.219
When peer group opinions support law breaking, there will be a net loss of
compliance among members of the stigmatized group. The "code of the street"
that has developed in opposition to "mainstream" values is "a cultural adaptation to
a profound lack of faith in the police and the judicial system; '220 inplace of a
reliance on racist and indifferent law enforcement officials, taking care of
oneself-even if it results in violence-becomes a primary indicator of control and
respect that supersedes compliance with externally-imposed legal authority.22 ' In

sum, the potential for stigma creation generated by the racially asymmetrical
distribution of prevalent and long sentences prescribed by law and order
cheerleaders to allay the problems that minority crime victims experiences
undermines the deterrent potential of these sentences where its needed most. Lawabiding African Americans in poor communities, then, must bear the costs of
stigma in exchange for few benefits.
B. Linked Fate andMultiple Roles

The effect of linked fate among all African Americans and the reality of
multiple roles played by individuals who hold very ambiguous positions with
respect to the terms "law breaker" and "law abider" in many inner-city
communities reinforce the detrimental impact that racial asymmetry in punishment
can have on the potential for the law-and-order approach to produce the levels of
crime reduction necessary for social organization improvement.
Linked fate refers to the empathy that people have with family and friends.
But it can also exist among strangers. In the African-American community, linked
fate has its foundation in the fact that the life chances of African Americans
218 For a figure illustrating this process, see Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections,
31 VAL. U. L. REV.579,592 (1997).
219 TYLER, supra note 182, at 20-27, 44-45, 58.
220 ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET, supra note 60, at 34.

221 Id.
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historically have been shaped by race. 222 The long history of race-based
constraints on life chances among blacks generates a certain efficiency in
evaluating policies that affect minority individuals. Many African Americans may
use what Michael Dawson calls the "black utility heuristic" to determine what in
their best interests. The heuristic allows an individual to determine what is in her
223
individual interests by relying on what is in the best interests of the group.
Whether familial, social, or racial group links are considered, the outcome is likely
to be the same. Minority residents of the inner city are less likely to condemn the
law breakers among them when they experience critical bonds with them. This
bonding process clearly undermines the crime reduction power of the law and
order approach to law enforcement.
The multiple roles that many inner-city residents play with respect to the
categories "law breaker" and "law abider" also undermine the efficacy of
deterrence policies based solely on formal punishment. The lines between law
breakers and law abiders are not so clean and clear as promoters of formal
punishment often suppose. Multiple roles are inevitable in poor, structurally weak
communities where it is not uncommon for law-abiding citizens to decry lawbreaking even as they rely on law breakers for necessary goods such as money and
security. If there are few well-paying employment opportunities in poor
communities, drug trafficking offers the promise of work and monetary benefits.22 4
Families that do not condone illegality might believe that they have to choose
between a shrinking social safety net or the illegal proceeds of drug transactions to
feed and clothe children.
Multiple roles are inevitable for another reason. In many cases victims in
poor communities are themselves law breakers in the more conventional sense.
Some individual victims in high crime inner-city neighborhoods, especially young
men, are not always victims. Instead they oscillate between being a victim in one
instance and an offender the next.
The ambiguity surrounding the terms "law breaker" and "law abider" in
communities that are not well-organized to resist crime can confound the aims of
those who promote increased imprisonment. When lines cannot be easily drawn
between law abiders and law breakers, a regime tethered to the power formal
sanctions to produce deterrence will be forced to raise the price of crime very high
indeed to insure differentiation between the two groups. Raising the price of crime
through increasing the severity of sanctions and perhaps the certainty of sanctions,
222 See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN PoLrrICs 77

(1994) (explaining the linked fate concept as a means of explaining the way that African Americans
perceive what is in their individual self-interest.).
223Id. at 10-11 (explaining that when race over-determines an individual's life chances, it is
much more efficient for that individual to use the relative and absolute status of the group as a proxy

for individual utility).
224 There are numerous accounts of the importance of drug selling as an important economic
activity in inner-city communities. See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 54; REUTER Er AL., supra note 143;
Venkatesh, supra note 81.
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though, creates an extreme risk of asymmetry in punishment that can undermine
crime reduction through stigma generation.
VI. DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT

In the U.S., the political demand for punishment often has reflected the
cyclical nature of social problems and social change. In particular, a series of
"moral panics" about social deviance have captured Americans' political attention
and imagination for nearly two centuries, embracing such problems as "unruly"
immigrant children, alcohol and drug problems, drunk drivers, child molesters,
juvenile delinquency and street gangs, and more recently, youth and domestic
violence. 225 Historically, these growth spurts in imprisonment reflects trends in the
criminalization of deviance or the management of the so-called dangerous
classes. 226 The opening of the House of Refuge in New York in 1824, for
example, was in part to reaction to problems of unsupervised youth in poor
neighborhoods resulting from immigration and in-migration during the rise of
manufacturing industry. 227 Over time, the expansion of child welfare and mental

health systems reflected the demand for non-custodial forms of social control, seen
on the one hand as benign alternatives to institutionalization, but alternatively as an
expanding state apparatus of social control.228

. Incarceration rates rose sharply beginning in the 1970s. Several political and
social trends fueled this increase, contributing to a cycle of political and social
demand for punishment. Frustration with rising crime rates, especially homicide
and "street" crimes such as robbery, together with social upheavals generally,
helped launch a conservative era of crime politics, beginning with the Safe Streets
Act of 1968.229 However, while homicide rates rose steadily beginning in the
1960s and declined through the 1990s, nearly all the increase and decline was in
225 JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS

(1981); JOHN R. SUTrroN,

STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY INTHE UNITED STATES, 1640-1981 (1988); DAVID
J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND rrs ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE
AMERICA (1980); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in Context: Politics and Media in the
Making of a Drug Scare, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 535 (1989).
226 See ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969);
GEORGE RuSCHE & OITo KiRCHHEImER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 5 (1939). They argue
that the similarities of regime, organization, and structure across institutions of social control
including factories, "workhouses" and prisons, are the consequence of their strategic overlap and
interrelated function with respect to the management of the so-called dangerous classes.
227 PLATr, supra note 226; DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL
ORDER AND DISORDER INTHE NEW REPUBUC (1971); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE
MAKING (2004); JUDITH SEALANDER, THE FAILED CENTURY OF THE CHILD (2003).
228 PAUL LERMAN, DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (1982); see also
FOUCAULT, supra note 29.
229 KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
POLmCS (1997); ELuOTr CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME (1985).

2008]

PUNISHMENT,DETERRENCE AND SOCIAL CONTROL

225

The same pattern was observed for gun robberies and
gun homicides.230
assaults.23' While many legislators reacted to a violence epidemic, in fact the
epidemiology of violence for nearly three decades suggested a contagious
epidemic of gun violence that was most disproportionately concentrated in poor
and minority communities. While lethal and near-lethal violence rose and fell
violence and other crimes remained relatively flat
cyclically, rates of non-lethal
232
since the early 1970s.
Despite good evidence of cyclical patterns of contagion and violent crime, a
variety of social constructions of the "violence" problem have been advanced, each
one justifying new demands for "tougher" sentences and increased punishment.
For example, increases in violent crime in the 1960s were attributed to sharp
23319
in the 1970s to youth
increases in heroin addiction in large U.S. cities,
234
and in the 1980s to youth gangs, guns, and drug traffickers. 235 Each
violence,
successive iteration of the etiology of rising violence rates lead to the identification
culturally, politically and socially of new "dangerous classes" that threatened
doses of punishment. Similar
public safety and whose crimes merited increased
236
trends were identified in the United Kingdom.
Importantly, the "dangerous classes" of the last two decades were "raced."
That is, crime became inextricably linked to African Americans, and AfricanAmerican men, in particular. Thus, the escalation in imprisonment can be read not
only as a reaction to the changing nature of violent crime and the country's
changing mores regarding drug offending, but it also can be read as a statement
regarding mainstream society's linkage of African-American men with crime.
This phenomenon is not confined to non-African Americans. The crystallization
of the connection between African-American men and criminality (that high levels
230 Jeffrey Fagan, Franklin E. Zimring & June Kim, Declining Homicide in New York City: A
Tale of Two Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1289-90 (1998) (showing that non-gun
homicide rates were unchanged over a 30-year period while gun homicide rates rose and declined
cyclically over the same period of time). See also ZIMRING & HAwKINS, supra note 7, at 21-24;
Alfred Blumstein, Disaggregatingthe Violence Trends, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 13 (Alfred
Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2d ed. 2005).
231 Jeffrey Fagan, Deanna L. Wilkinson & Garth Davies, Social Contagion of Violence, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 694-97 (Daniel J. Flannery,

Alexander T. Vazsonyi & Irwin D. Waldman eds., 2007) (showing similar patterns and trajectories of
gun and non-gun lethal and non-lethal violence).
232Id at 698-700. See also Richard Rosenfeld, Patterns in Adult Homicide: 1980-1995, in
THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra note 230, at 130, 135-43.
233Jan M. Chalken & Marcia R. Chaiken, Drugs and Predatory Crime, in DRUGS AND CRIME
203, 203 (Michael Tonry & James Q. Wilson, eds., 1990). For data on England, see NICHOLAS DORN,
KARIM MuRii & NIGEL SOUTH, TRAFFICKERS: DRUG MARKETS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1992).
234 PAUL A. STRASBURG, VIOLENT DELINQUENTS (1978).
235Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 10 (1995); James
at 521.

Q. Wilson, Drugs and Crime, in DRUGS AND

CRIME, supra note 233

236 See BEATRiX CAMPBELL, GOLIATH: BRITAIN'S DANGEROUS PLACES (1993).
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of incarceration promote) engenders distrust within African-American
communities.
The Reverend Jesse Jackson is not unique among African
Americans in fearing victimization by young African-American men.237
Weakening of already compromised social structures in poor communities
and increased detachment of African Americans generally from government and
political participation is a high price to pay for the American commitment to the
"get tough" crime control policy. The growth of punishment during the last decade
created another paradox: allocations to punishment increased during an era of
declining public resources and strains on a wide range of services.238 Arguably, in
a zero-sum game of public financing, funds allocated to punishment were de jure
reductions in allocations to other services. Some of this was fueled by economic
circumstances and the realities of state and municipal finance: declining tax bases,
increasing drains on budgets for health care and social welfare, reduced federal
assistance. It also occurred in a political context of declining confidence in public
institutions such as schools and social service agencies. The defunding of services
affected social areas and groups who were most involved in punishment, either
directly or through family and kinship relationships.
Here, then, is the paradox: the growth of punishment and the correctional
industry resulted in the transfer of resources away from the mediating institutions
and sources of social control that form the structure of informal social control that
are so critical in the high crime communities we have discussed. A steadily
weakening structure of informal social control gives rise to the need for increased
investments in formal social control, often in the form of formal punishment. Both
public and private corrections have flourished in the past decade as this cycle
accelerated in the U.S. The demand for punishment provided political support (or
cover) for rapid and unprecedented prison expansion. This demand, expressed in
the legislatures, at the polling places and through reciprocity between popular
culture and political institutions, is what von Hirsch calls "law and order"
populism. 239 This populism increased markedly during the period of prison
expansion and defunding of informal sources of social controls. Ironically, the
same institutions that serve as informal social control also were the same
institutions that in the past could mediate the demand for punishment. In the
absence of viable mediating mechanisms, there was unfettered expansion of
punishment and corrections.
The decline in confidence in public institutions not only diverted resources
from institutions such as health care and schools, but it also bifurcates public sector
reaction to rising crime rates. Faced with a crisis of crime, societal reaction could
take several directions. One direction might be toward increased punishment and
formal control. That is, the state could react by increasing its punitive-control
237 See Richard Cohen, Common Ground on Crime, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 1993, at A23.

238 See generally MAuER, supra note 5; WESTERN, supra note 5.
239 See Andrew von Hirsch, The Logic of Prison Growth, 57 MOD. L. REv. 476, 478 (1994)
(book review).
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apparatus. Another direction might involve ameliorative and preventive reactions
that emphasize the state's role in socialization and social development . 2z 4 A third
direction might be to pursue a decentralization of state functions of control ceding
responsibility to private institutions. The public response in the U.S. has taken the
direction of an increased state role in punishment and formal control. Nowhere in
contemporary crime policy is there recognition of a public sector role to strengthen
informal mediating institutions of socialization and informal control. Instead,
public responses were bifurcated: increased allocation of state resources to
punishment, coupled with highly localized populist "watchman" forms of informal
control such as surveillance mechanisms, block watches, and the criminology of
"place." The conservative politics of this era redefined the state role in crime
control away from socialization and social development and toward punishment.
And prevention through technology replaced prevention through socialization and
social control, with the former ceded to the private sector.
The expansion of punishment institutions was the result initially of a political
demand for punishment, but recent analysis suggests that the demand for
punishment now is sustained by the industry itself.24' While the demand for
punishment may have its origins in "law and order populism," its current support is
sustained through complex political processes that involve the cultural
mobilization of resentments against disapproved behavior, and against populations
that invoke fear.2 4 2 But popular support for expanding corrections through "law
and order populism" also gave rise to a correctional industry has become an
autonomous source of demand for punishment. These institutions have achieved a
threshold where they have the motivations and means for perpetuating the political
processes that sustain a continuous expansion, and that redistribute public
resources away from mediating institutions toward correctional ones.
This drain will insure that mediating institutions remain weak relative to legal
institutions, continuing the cycles that contribute to the demand for punishment. A
recent study by the California Policy Research Center at the University of
California showed that corrections spending continued to match K-12 education
spending in California as recently as 2006.243 While that projection was not
240

While this response now seems the province of the far-left, the moderate establishment

figures endorsed this type of idea when looking to increased opportunities for urban African
Americans and an attack on racial discrimination. 'There are those who oppose these aims as
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these aims to fulfill our pledge of equality and to meet the fundamental needs of a democratic,
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ultimately realized, budget -projections show that corrections spending will
overtake higher education spending there by 2013. 244 Among African-American
men, however, that milestone seems distant; there are already four times as many
black men incarcerated in the state's prisons as enrolled in public universities, even
as the lack of new colleges limits access of tens of thousands of Californians to
public higher education. 245 This possibility is all the more remarkable in light of
the political activism and high levels of electoral
campaign contributions of the
24 6
union of correctional officers in California.
VII. CONCLUSION

The continuing social restructuring of work and community will maintain
political tensions that give rise to escalating demand for formal punishment, at the
same time that this same restructuring weakens the forms of informal controls that
formal controls would supplant. The allocation of resources from informal to
formal social controls, particularly punishment through incarceration, sustains a
process that contributes to the marginalization of already isolated communities and
individuals, further weakening informal controls and continuing the cycle of
discontrol and punishment.
In many communities, punishment has become normative, losing its
contingent value that lends credibility to its claims of fairness and
proportionality. 247 As the social and cultural distance between the punishers and
the punished continues to widen, respect for the legitimacy of punishment will
suffer. This is one source of the perverse escalatory effects of punishment, and a
source that appears unlikely to abate in a continuous process of deindustrialization
and restructuring of work. The globalization of economic restructuring will sustain
the political basis for the expansion of punishment: disquiet in the popular culture
will continue as economic uncertainty fuels suspicion and rejection of
marginalized or alien populations.
What passes for "control" today in the U.S. is an odd combination of large
correctional institutions and elaborate networks of surveillance systems: cameras,
244
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At.
245 Elliot Currie, Race, Violence, and Justice since Kerner, in LOCKED IN THE POORHOUSE:
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eds., 1998).
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Challenges to Status Quo, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2004, at B-I, available at
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247 Nagin, supra note 12, at 23 (constructing a theory of "stigma erosion," where high rates of
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urine testing devices, infrared detectors, and so forth. De-emphasized is the state's
role in socialization and the fostering of moral communities. The devolving of the
public sector involvement in socialization, and the continuing privatization of
"security," will further weaken informal social controls and mediating institutions.
This restructuring and devaluation of government, accompanied by the
restructuring and fragmentation of economic activity, makes difficult the
achievement of a social consensus on the rationale of punishment in a broader
context of social control. How will the reintegrative functions of punishment be
achieved when social functions
are limited to those essential only to economic, but
48
not social, well-being?1
Historically, punishment has been part of social control when formal and
informal social controls are reciprocal and complementary, and when punishment
is perceived as fair substantively and procedurally. Punishment has thrived
independently of social control in the political context of weak government that
assumes no role in other social functions. This paradoxical affinity of punitiveness
and weak government points the way toward new policies that will reverse the
weak if not iatrogenic effects of punishment with respect to crime. The
reconfiguration of criminal justice along lines of reintegrative justice, substantive
rationality, and proportional and procedural fairness, is one large step. Social and
economic policies designed to produce social and human capital will strengthen
the moral basis of punishment, and paradoxically, reduce the demand for it.
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